University of Mississippi

eGrove
AICPA Annual Reports

American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection

1951

Tax problems being met in today's mobilization economy,
complete text of papers presented at the 64th annual meeting of
the American Institute of Accountants
American Institute of Accountants

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
American Institute of Accountants, "Tax problems being met in today's mobilization economy, complete
text of papers presented at the 64th annual meeting of the American Institute of Accountants" (1951).
AICPA Annual Reports. 202.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_arprts/202

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Historical Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in AICPA Annual Reports by an
authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Tax Problems
ACCOUNTANTS AND THE

BUREAU OF INTERNAL

REVENUE ............. John B. Dunlap

Commissioner of Internal Revenue

BEING MET IN TODAY’S

FEDERAL INCOME-TAX PANEL

Hal Canary
William H. Westphal
Russell S. Bock
Walter M. Bury
W. Waller Grogan
Charles N. Whitehead

Mobilization

EXCESS-PROFITS-TAX PANEL

J. S. Seidman
T. T. Shaw
Wallace M. Jensen

Economy
COMPLETE TEXT OF PAPERS PRESENTED
AT THE 64TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AMERICAN

INSTITUTE

OF

ACCOUNTANTS

This is one of four publications
fourth Annual Meeting of the
which was held in Atlantic City,
list, and prices at which each

containing papers from the Sixty
American Institute of Accountants
October 6-10, 1951. The complete
pamphlet may be bought, follow:

Five New Guides to the Auditor's Responsibility

Price $0.75

Gordon M. Hill ........... Auditor’s Responsibility for Events After Bal
ance-Sheet Date
Donald J. Bevis ........... Auditor’s Responsibility for Client’s Compli
ance with “Controls”
J. Woodrow Mathews . . . . Reliance upon Other Auditors
A. Frank Stewart ......... Experience with Statement 23
Walter R. Flack ........... What Is Wrong with the Long-Form Report?
Public Relations and Legislative Control
of the Accounting Profession

Public Relations
George E. Perrin
Paul Grady
A. H. Puder
O. G. Roquemore
Arthur M. Sargent
Financial Information Needed in
Today's Mobilization Economy

Harold E. Stassen ....
John T. Koehler .....
Roy Blough .............
Charles E. Wilson ....

H. W. Bordner .......
W. J. McNeil ...........
Paul M. Green .......
T. R. Rampy ...........

Price $0.50

Legislative Control
Robert L. Miller
Donald P. Perry
L. C. J. Yeager

Price $1.00

Freedom and Finance
Renegotiating Under the 1951 Act
Economic Problems of Mobilization
Mobilization—Where We Stand and Where
We’re Going
Accounting Aspects of Pricing in Negotiated
Contracts
Financial Aspects of Defense Mobilization
Accounting in Price Stabilization
Auditing in the Air Force

Tax Problems Being Met in Today’s Mobilization Economy
Price $1.00

See contents on page 3.
The complete set may be purchased for $3.00. Order from the AIA.

Tax Problems
COMPLETE TEXT OF PA

PERS PRESENTED AT THE

64thANNUALMEETINGOF
THE

AMERICAN

BEING MET IN TODAY’S

INSTI

TUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS

Mobilization

Economy

INSTITUTE

270 MADISON AVENUE

OF ACCOUNTANTS

•

NEW YORK 16

Copyright 1951

by the

American Institute

of

Accountants

CONTENTS

Accountants and the Bureau
of Internal Revenue . . John B. Dunlap

Page

5

Federal Income-Tax Panel
Hal Canary ..................................................... 10, 23

Russell S. Bock............................................... 12, 24

W. Waller Grogan ....................................... 13, 26
William H. Westphal ................................... 15, 27

Walter M. Bury ............................................. 17, 28
Charles N. Whitehead ................................. 21, 30

Excess-Profits-Tax Panel
J. S. Seidman .....................................................

35

T. T. Shaw .........................................................

38

Wallace M. Jensen ...........................................

42

JOHN B. DUNLAP, a native
of Dallas, Texas, has been
Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue since last August.
He has been in the Bureau
since 1934. During the war,
Mr. Dunlap served in the
Army doing Intelligence work.
He was released from active
duty in 1945 when he held the
rank of Brigadier General.

Accountants and the

Bureau of Internal Revenue
by John B. Dunlap, Commissioner of Internal Revenue

T is only fair that you, as members of
the accounting profession, should know
how your Commissioner of Internal Rev
enue feels in connection with certain mat
ters, so that we can have a meeting of
minds and come together on a common
meeting ground wherever the occasion de
mands. It was my practice in Texas—and
my division covered the state of Texas—
to meet with the accountants and the mem
bers of the legal profession at every pos
sible opportunity. I even encouraged them
to come to us. I published a little bulletin
and kept them posted with the latest
developments and procedures that we
were following in the Dallas Division and
in the various collector’s offices and I tried
to make personal friends out of every one
of them for the simple reason that I
knew, as I now know, that the accountants
in this country can do more to help the
Bureau of Internal Revenue and that the
Bureau of Internal Revenue can do more
to help them when we understand each
other and are friendly than could ever
otherwise be possible. I want you to know
that one of the first things I am doing is
to try to encourage in all our divisions a
very, very close acquaintanceship with our
accountant friends.
There are a lot of things that are for
the public good, and one of them is
reflected in what I told my assistants and
deputies in Washington. Every time they
put one of these things across my desk for
me to sign, so far, I have sent it back
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and said, “Rewrite this thing so I can
understand it.” I do that knowing that if
I can understand it anybody can.
So I want to repeat that I am looking
forward to a very happy relationship with
my friends in the accounting profession
because we have very, very many mutual
problems that face us all. We have one
very common meeting ground, and it has
been a ground which has not been plowed
thoroughly on the part of Internal Rev
enue, and that is that it should be to both
of our interests to see that the citizens
of the United States pay only their just
taxes. I don’t like chiselers and I don’t
like to see any internal Revenue agent
make an assessment or recommend one
just because he thinks he has to make a
showing. That will be cut out. The jug
gling of income from one year to another,
for instance, just to chisel the taxpayer
out of some interest is against my Bible.
There is another thing, as we begin this
talk, that I wish you would bear in mind.
I know that tax people are not popular
with the public and, in many cases, 1
know that they are not popular with the
accountants, but I should like to leave this
little question with you: where would your
business be if it were not for the Bureau
of Internal Revenue?
Both the accounting profession and the
Bureau face many problems where we can
be of great help to each other. These
problems fall into two categories, in my
opinion: in the first one are the problems
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of our own making and in the second one
are the problems that are beyond our con
trol. I should like to talk for a few minutes
about those that are beyond our control.
By “those that are beyond our control,” I
mean those that arise from the statutes
enacted by Congress itself. After the stat
ute is enacted, it is beyond our power or
beyond yours to do anything about it ex
cept to accept it as it is, get it inter
preted through the courts, or possibly get
it repealed. But while we can do something
in the way of influencing Congress to see
that proper tax laws are enacted, by far
the greatest number of our problems come
from the taxes enacted into law.
One of the great problems that we are
faced with today, and that you are faced
with today, is the rapidly changing tax
picture. We had the Act of 1950 passed
late in 1950. We have the Excess Profits
Tax Act which became effective in Jan
uary, 1951, and now we have a new law
that we hope will become effective before
too much longer, not because I am anxious
to see a new law, but because of the
problems that are going to arise if it is
delayed much longer.
The very swiftness of the passage of
those acts after the Korean crisis has
brought many, many problems to all of us.
Even all the regulations are not yet writ
ten under those laws. It is a human im
possibility to get them written and pub
lished as quickly as that. That is a
tremendous problem to the Bureau, and I
know that it is to you, to try to file tax
returns without adequate regulations. It is
a very tough proposition. You are guess
ing; you are in the dark; you don’t know
how the Commissioner is going to interpret
those laws in the regulations.
One of the problems that we face, and
must face, goes right back to the enact
ment of the Excess Profits Tax Act in
January of 1951. Even before all the
returns are filed, we are faced with a
new Excess Profits Act, or rather amend
ments to the one already in existence. It
was necessary for the Congress to extend
the statutory provision for extensions to
November 15, 1951, so you no more than
get the returns filed under the ’51 act,
than you are faced immediately with the

necessity for filing a new return under the
new change. It is a very unfortunate thing.
I know the problems that it creates among
the accounting profession. I just want
you to understand the problems it creates
in the Bureau. The President has prom
ised the Congress an early analysis of the
effect of the Excess Profits Tax Act of
1951 and, of course, it has been impossible
to prepare any such analysis—even though
it is being demanded every day—until
the returns are in. So we have a prob
lem there as well as you.
Another problem that comes with this
new Excess Profits Tax Act arises from
the very fact that it will be five more years
before the old one is cleaned up. True, it
is the goal of the Bureau and its excess
profits tax counsel to wind up its work by
the end of this year, but we can’t do it.
There will still be some three hundred
major cases left over at the end of 1951.
I know the grief that will arise in some
corporations until those problems are
settled, but it is a job on which we are
hammering away and on which we are do
ing the best we can. I only hope that we
don’t get into such a mess on the new one.
At the present time, I don’t see how we
can keep from it.
The act that is now before Congress is
going to present many, many problems to
all of us. The major problem that it is
going to face us with immediately is the
difficulty of getting into your hands the
materials with which you must work, al
most as soon at it is passed. We cannot
even begin to make a deal with the public
printer to get our returns printed until
Congress passes that act. We cannot get
out the withholding tables until we know
what the rates are going to be. The act
is going to call, I am sure, for an effective
date of November 1st. So, after final pas
sage of the act, it is going to be necessary
for the Bureau to undertake a tremendous
mechanical problem of placing in your
hands and in the hands of all other busi
ness people in the country the withholding
tax tables under the new act.
That is going to be a major problem to
us. We may have to call for outside help
in getting it done. I mean by that, getting
newspapers and magazines and others to
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help us out by printing those figures before
we can get the pamphlets from the Govern
ment Printing Office.
We cannot complete action on the in
come tax returns themselves. We don’t
know what the rate is going to be but
we do know what some of the other pro
visions are going to be. So, at the present
time, all we can do is to keep changing
that dummy form every day as the con
ference goes along so that the minute
agreement is struck we can turn those
things over to the public printer. That
doesn’t involve only the income tax re
turns themselves, the Form 1040, 1040 A,
and all the rest of them, it involves all the
accompanying regulations, Treasury deci
sions, everything else that has to be pub
lished in connection with the new income
tax law. So I plead with you, be patient
with us. We are as helpless as we can be
in the matter and only through your good
will can we hope to convey to the public
the problem that is going to be presented
when they want blank returns and we
cannot yet furnish them. We are doing our
best to meet our deadlines on it, but bear
in mind that you may not be able to get
what you want when you want it due to
the lateness of the passage of the act.
In connection with these same forms,
we have another mutual problem, that is,
the expense in connection with it. Last
year the Bureau printed some 785 million
returns. I am talking about income tax
returns, not the little withholding and
Social Security returns. That is a tremen
dous expense. Congress doesn’t understand
why we should have to print so many. I
do, and I am sure you do. I know that
the taxpayer wants a copy, the accountant
wants a copy, there has got to be a scratch
work copy, and the government wants a
copy. But, even so, multiply the number of
taxpayers by the number of returns and
you come up with a lot more than that.
One of the reasons, of course, is the fact
that the Bureau mails out returns to all
taxpayers every year and that those re
turns are seldom used in the preparation
of the final return. You all want the un
folded smooth copies to work with and
I don’t blame you. That is what I always
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use myself. But that must be. It may be
looked upon in one light as an economic
waste but in another light we find that it
has a very valuable psychological effect.
It is one of the very few pieces of direct
mail advertising that the Bureau is allowed
to have.
In that connection I would like to get
your reaction to an experiment we are
going to try this year in only the states
of Indiana and Massachusetts. Those in
states can find out from their friends
there how it works. The returns will come
in package form; they will not be folded.
Every schedule, the necessary returns, in
structions, and everything else, will come
in a preaddressed package form, so that
we can eliminate the necessity of having
collectors’ offices stuff those returns into
envelopes by hand. This is a tremendously
costly job, not only in dollars, but in
wasted manpower which could better be
doing something else. If it works, we shall
spread it all over the whole country next
year. It will be a much simpler job for
the Bureau. The returns will come in per
fect shape, unfolded and useable. We
would like to have your reaction to that
experiment as you see those package deals
come out.
We have another mutual problem, the
cost analysis of our tax laws to enable us
to recommend to the Congress methods of
simplification which will benefit us all.
There has been some of that done in the
past, but I don’t think there has been
enough of it. I should like you to give
serious consideration to giving the Bureau
all the help you can and, I assure you, we
will do our best at our end. You people
are in close contact with your clients’
problems, you know the effect of these
laws, you know the work some of them
cause—and possibly cause unnecessarily—
and only through our combined efforts
will we ever be successful in any simplifi
cation.
Our tax structure has gotten to the point
where we must, in my opinion, do some
thing to simplify it other than explaining
them in the directives that come out. The
laws themselves must be simplified. Any
suggestions that you people can make to
us along those lines will be deeply appre
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ciated. We should like to have your views,
we want your views, and I trust that,
through your legislative committees, you
will have no hesitancy in recommending
to us any changes that you think would be
to the benefit of the American taxpayer.
I am not talking about reduction of taxes,
that is out of our field. I also extend to
each of you as individuals an invitation to
let us have your ideas along that line.
We are going to face another problem.
You may not consider it mutual, but I
think you will find that it is mutual before
it is over. It is contained in some of the
new provisions of the new act, provisions
which I am certain will be enacted into
law because they were enacted identically
in both houses of Congress. Never before
has it become the duty of the Internal
Revenue Service to enforce a law passed,
I feel primarily, for the public good. They
passed a law like that under Mr. Volstead’s
direction some years back. But we are
going to be faced with a major problem
in the enforcement of this new gambling
law. In my opinion, it is not a tax law, it
is a policing statute. It is going to require
that the Bureau’s field officers become
criminal type investigators all the way
through in handling this type of tax be
cause under it we are going to have to
prove that these people are in the illegal
gambling industry.
That is going to mean, I am fearful—I
am really fearful of what it will mean—
that we are going to have to have some
four thousand additional field men and this
will cost some forty million dollars a year
to enforce that tax. It is going to call for
the keeping of records such as no busi
nessman was ever required to keep before
and that is your end of it.
Another problem that is going to be
more and more mutual is the fact that
Congress is awakening to the fact that
many, many taxpayers have not kept the
kind of records that they should have kept
and that, after the new tax law becomes
effective, you are going to see bills start
through Congress to tighten up the re
quirements on record keeping, the kind of
records that must be kept. It is going to
mean no reflection on the kind of clients
that I am sure most of you have, but it

will be a tough proposition. The failure to
keep proper records will become a felony
rather than a misdemeanor, and that could
be a serious proposition. Already, under its
present power, the Bureau has issued
instructions which are being carried out.
We are serving notice upon taxpayers
whom we do not think have adequate
records to enable us to determine their
true tax liability. It is a warning calling
their attention to the law and the type of
records they should keep so that when we
come back the following year, if the
records are not there, the groundwork will
have been laid for the prosecution. I
should like your help in spreading that
word around. That is a direct outgrowth of
our activities in the racketeering field.
Another major problem that is of our
own making—some of it cannot be pre
vented but the bulk of it can—is the
time lag between the time that the income
tax return is filed and the time the
businessman knows his final tax answer.
I am making every effort in the Bureau
to adopt measures to cut down that
time lag, but there again it is a problem,
not only ours but yours. We are attacking
it in several ways. In the first place—it
has not been published yet, but it will be
in the next few days—we have completely
reorganized the income tax unit in the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. It has been
changed from a mass of unrelated activi
ties into a few well-knit divisions operating
along functional lines. This will enable
us to complete our work more quickly and
more efficiently in the Bureau and it will
give you quicker answers to some of your
problems than you have ever gotten before.
In addition to that, we are strengthen
ing the technical staff. That is a hard
thing to do but we are giving them as
many more people as we can and are
streamlining procedures so that we can
get those cases cleared through the techni
cal staff much more quickly in the future
than we ever have in the past. The trouble
is that there is a big backlog there and it
will be some months before we get down
to the working level that we hope to main
tain in the future. We are encouraging
informal conferences on the field level. By
that I mean that we are instructing our
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officers to hold informal conferences at the
group chief’s level within the agent’s office.
We have discovered that oftentimes some of
the failures of Internal Revenue agents to
complete a case or to get an agreement
either through additional proposed assess
ment or a refund arise from pure per
sonality reasons or a possible misunder
standing of the statutes and regulations
involved on the part of the agent—some
times on the part of the taxpayer—so we
are, in those cases, requiring the group
chief to hold an informal conference with
the taxpayer and his representatives and
the agent in an attempt
close that case
before it ever gets to the agent’s office.
It is paying big dividends in some
parts of the country. I think it is a step
in the right direction and I think that
after you have sat in on a few of those
conferences you will begin to think so
yourselves. At any rate, it is a step towards
reducing the work load in the Bureau so
that we can cut down this time lag.
Now we come to the part where we
need your help. We should like to dis
courage the postponement of conferences
once set, in the agent’s offices or the
technical staff or anywhere else. Once a
conference is set, the conferree on our
side of the case must come up to date on
it, must be ready for the conference. You
also must be ready for the conference. If
for some reason the conference must be
postponed, the day is lost for the conferree.
On the day set aside for the case he must
put it aside and go to work on other cases.
Whenever another conference is set he has
all that work to do over again. We should
like your cooperation in eliminating, so far
as possible, the postponement of formal
conferences set in our agents’ and techni
cal staff offices.
I have mentioned that one of the reasons
for encouraging informal field con
ferences has been personality clashes. Of
course, there are two sides to the question.
I have known accountants, and so have
you, who were so cantankerous that nobody
could do business with them. They are al
ways right. They are the last word. No
body can do business with them. I know,
thank heaven, only one or two. I also
know Internal Revenue agents who have
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been so cast in iron that they cannot see
but one side of the picture, and who have
the habit of saying, “I won’t allow this,”
and “I won’t allow that;” “Well, that has
nothing to do with it.” I am trying to eli
minate that frame of mind in our field
people, but bear in mind that all of us are
human beings. I think that after a meeting
that I shall have in the Bureau, of the heads
of all our field offices next week, that some
of my policies will begin to spread over the
country as they have already spread over
Texas, and I feel that we shall have a
much happier relationship. So I plead
with you, do your part and we shall do
ours. We do not want in the Internal
Revenue Service any arbitrary, unsettled
people. If you know of any such people,
it is your duty to help us straighten the
matter out.
Another mutual problem that we have
is the terrific peak load periods that strike
you and us, of course, at the same time. I
should like to ask that you help us as
much as you can in leveling out those
peak load periods. The biggest one, of
course, is the March 15 period. There is
nothing much that we can do to take off
the terrific load that actually hits at mid
night on March 15, except to encourage
people to file at the earliest possible date.
That is not hard to do where they have
money coming back. It is pretty hard to
do when they owe it. But if you will urge
your clients to get their returns in at the
earliest possible date, it will be a tremen
dous help to us. On the other hand, we
know that you are burdened down and
that there is no accountant with any
appreciable amount of business who can
possibly do all the work he is required to
do between January 1 and March 15. We
know you have to have extensions and we
want to give them to you, will give them to
you, but you can lessen our work if you
will stop asking for short extensions.
I don’t like to see our collectors grant
even 30 and 60-day extensions. If you are
going to ask for an extension, ask for 90
days, and if you can file a return earlier,
do it. But if you ask for a 30-day extension
and can’t do it, you ask for another and
then another which gives you 90 days any
how but we have three clerical jobs issu

ing the three extensions. My policy as
Collector was, and it will be the
policy of all Collectors, that when
you write for an extension you are going
to get 90 days whether you ask for it or
not. That eliminates, as I said, a tremen
dous amount of clerical work in the col
lector’s offices. I should like to tell you
that that can be put on a more informal
basis but you know as well as I that the
value of these extension letters is
negligible in the year a return is filed but
they may be of considerable value in later
years to establish the fact that the return
was filed under an extension, even though
the copy of the extension may have been
lost from the return. So help us out in that
way. Don’t ask for those short extensions
just because you think it is easier to get a
30-day one than it is a 90. It isn’t.
I have not attempted to cover all the
problems that face us mutually. I have just
merely touched on them so that you and
I could get to know each other better and
perhaps think along the same lines.
I want to leave that field for a minute
and go to one that is still more serious
than anything we have mentioned yet.
I am not a politician. I know nothing
about politics, I care nothing about
politics, I never have, and I never will.
There is no man in the United States
more anxious to see the integrity of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue unchallenged
than I, and I can assure you that any
place I find it challenged, lightning will
strike just as it struck in California a
couple of weeks ago.
The Bureau is paying the penalty for
the acts of some collectors of Internal
Revenue. That is going to stop. I can
assure you very, very conscientiously
that it is going to stop. The Presi
dent has told me many times personally to
do whatever I thought was necessary to
correct that situation. There are going to
be no politics in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue from now on.
Now it is time for your part of it. No
deputy collector and no Internal Revenue
agent who has gotten into trouble so far,
that I know anything about, got into it
by himself. Not one of them. It is a twosided proposition. So you do your part.
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Federal In

Panel
Status of over-ceiling payments in com

puting taxable income.
With the renewal of price controls re
newed importance attaches to the income

tax status of payments which exceed ceil
ing prices. The question presented is

whether such over-ceiling payments con

stitute allowable deductions and whether

and to what extent such expenditures are
deductible in computing taxable income.
HAL CANARY

There seems to be no question but that
over-ceiling payments may be properly dis
allowed by the Commissioner as deductions
from gross income in arriving at taxable
income. That point does not seem to have
been contested by any of the taxpayers
penalized under Regulations 111, Section
29.23(a) (16), or I.T. 3724.
But the question has arisen when the
over-ceiling payments were included as a
part of the cost of goods sold, rather than
as a deduction from gross income in ar
riving at net taxable income.
This issue was first handled by the Tax
Court in the case of Lela Sullenger, 11
T.C. 1076, and it was held that over-ceil
ing payments for meat were a part of the
cost of goods sold, and as such were not
deductions allowable by legislative grace,
but were capital, the taxation of which
was not authorized by the 16th amend
ment to the constitution. The Commission
er’s appeal to the Circuit Court for the
Fifth Circuit was dismissed early in 1950.

Hal Canary, a member of the Institute
subcommittee on long-range tax policy,
is a partner with Harry M. Jay Associ
ates in Memphis, Tennessee. He was at
one time president of the Tennessee
Society of Certified Public Accountants

come-Tax

Russel M. Bock is a past president of
the Los Angeles chapter of the Califor
nia Society of CPAs. A frequent contrib
utor to The Journal of Accountancy, Mr.
Bock is a partner with the firm of Ernst
and Ernst in their Los Angeles office

The Commissioner has carried several
other cases on the same question to the
Tax Court, has invariably lost where over
ceiling prices were paid for merchandise
for resale, and has also invariably ap
pealed the cases to the Circuit Courts.
Some of the tax commentators pointed
out at the time the Sullenger decision was
handed down (Woman CPA, February,
1949), that since the Tax Court had de
cided that neither Congress nor the Com
missioner have power to deny any part of
the taxpayer’s cost of goods sold in arriv
ing at taxable income, the way might be
open to the inclusion in the cost of goods
sold of wages paid in contravention of
wage stabilization regulations, where the
wages constituted direct manufacturing
costs.
This second issue has now been decided
by the Tax Court in Weather-Seal Mfg.
Co., 16 T.C. . . ., No. 158, in a decision
adverse to the taxpayer and inconsistent
with its decision in the Sullenger case.
The former case is now on appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
In the Weather-Seal case, the Court rea
soned that salaries and wages are allow
able under Section 23 of the Code only
when reasonable in amount, and that
wages paid at over-ceiling rates are clearly
unreasonable. It did not explain the dis
allowance of the entire wage so paid,
rather than only the unreasonable portion,
as is customary.
The Court also failed to note that if
wages are deductible under Section 23,
they are deductible from gross income,
and that gross income is gross receipts

Charles N. Whitehead, CPA, is a part
ner with McClaren, Goode, West, and
Company in San Francisco. He is a past
chairman of the Tax Committee of the
San Francisco Chapter of the California
Society of Certified Public Accountants

Walter M. Bury, CPA, member of AIA,
is associated with the Detroit office of
Ernst and Ernst where he holds the posi
tion of Assistant Manager. He is asso
ciate editor of The Michigan CPA, the
publication of the society of that state

William H. Westphal, member of AIA,
is a former agent of the Internal Reve
nue Bureau and a CPA in Georgia,
North Carolina, and Virginia. He is a
partner with A. M. Pullen & Company
located in Greensboro, North Carolina

W. Waller Grogan, CPA, AIA, is a
member of the Institute subcommittee
on long-range tax policy. Mr. Grogan has
lectured at the NYU Institute on Taxa
tion and at the Jefferson School of Law
which is located in Louisville, Kentucky
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less cost of goods sold, which cost in
cluded, among other things, the cost of
direct labor. Nor did the Court explain
how the taxpayer’s inventory, computed at
cost, and including direct labor, in accord
ance with Section 29.22(c) (3) of the
Regulations, should be reduced.
In the Sullenger case the Tax Court was
not greatly concerned with the public
good, but having since then been affirmed
in the case of the optician who paid physi
cians “kick-backs” not illegally, but to the
detriment of the public good, it became
more concerned with the morals of the

matter and cited that case (Thos. B. Lilly,
188 F. (2d) 269, affirming 14 T.C. 1066)
in the Weather-Seal decision. Some day the
Bureau of Internal Revenue may follow
that line of reasoning to the point where
it will attempt to deny as a deduction from
gross receipts cost of liquor purchased for
resale by bootleggers in dry states, as con
trary to public good.
At this time, if the taxpayer is to pre
vail on issues of this type it will have to
be on the question of constitutionality, and
he cannot be sure until the Appellate
Court has heard the Weather-Seal case.

Should capital-gains benefits be claimed by licensor under exclusive license?

In the case of Myers, 6 T.C. 258, and numerous subsequent decisions, it has been

consistently held that proceeds received by an amateur inventor under an exclusive
license to make use and sell products embodying his invention constitute capital

gains. The Commissioner’s acquiescence in the Myers case established this as a recog
nizable precedent for the field offices of the Treasury. However, in March, 1950, the

Treasury promulgated Mim. 6490 withdrawing such acquiescence. The field offices
had previously ceased following the Myers case, apparently under specific instructions
from the Commissioner’s office. At the time of promulgating Mim. 6490 the Treas

ury was active in developing a provision for legislation to conform with the procedure
stated in that mimeograph and such provision was included in the Revenue Bill of
1950. The provision was eliminated from the bill, although the corresponding provi

sions relating to copyrights and artistic compositions were left in the bill and became
enacted into law.
What procedure should be followed by an amateur inventor for the year 1951,
assuming that he holds the type of license involved in the Myers case?
RUSSELL S. BOCK

I believe that an amateur inventor who
receives in 1951 so-called “royalty” in
come of the type involved in the Myers
case should claim capital gain treatment.
The Myers case (6 T.C. 258) involved
an exclusive license to make, use, and sell
the patented articles. The courts have con
sistently held that such a license is in sub
stance a sale and should be so treated for
tax purposes. The Treasury originally ac
quiesced in the Myers case, but in March,
1950, issued Mim. 6490 which withdrew
the acquiescence and substituted a non
acquiescence. Mim. 6490 further pro
claimed the Treasury’s future policy of
denying capital-gains treatment on all in
come of this general type, regardless of

the form of contract. During its considera
tion of the Revenue Act of 1950, Congress
gave some indication that it did not sym
pathize with the Treasury’s attitude when
the Senate eliminated a provision that
would have treated as ordinary income
any gain on the sale of a patent. Thus the
Treasury’s position seems to be contrary to
the attitude of Congress as well as that of
the courts. Under these circumstances, so
long as there is enough involved to make
it worth while to litigate the matter, I be
lieve that the inventor would be well ad
vised to claim capital-gains benefits, until
such time as the question of proper treat
ment of such income is finally settled.
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What procedure is applicable to professional fee-splitting?
The Treasury agents are actively following the Tax Court’s decision in the Lilly
case (14 T.C. 1066) and denying deductions by surgeons for the portion of their fees

paid over to other physicians who are instrumental in causing patients to use the
services of the surgeons.

To what extent is this procedure applicable? Is there any danger to lawyers and
accountants in similar forwarding fee? The Institute recognizes the propriety of a
forwarding fee and fee-splitting seems to be quite well recognized among attorneys.

What action, if any, can be taken by doctors to overcome the inequitable tax bur

den of such disallowances?

W. WALLER GROGAN

In view of the case of Thomas B. Lilly,
Helen W. Lilly, 14 T.C. 1066, 1950, af
firmed C.C.A. 4 (1951) 188 F.2d 269, cer
tiorari granted October 8, 1951, is there
any danger to lawyers and accountants in
the disallowance of the deduction of for
warding fees? What action, if any, can be
taken by doctors to overcome the in
equitable tax burden of such disallow
ances?
I believe that many tax practitioners
feel that the Tax Court has done some
“legislating” in the Lilly case. This case
appears to be the first instance of the dis
allowance of a business deduction because
it opposes public policy—stemming from
a purely ethical situation. In the Lilly
case, so-called “kick-backs” paid to ocu
lists by an optical firm were denied as
“ordinary and necessary business deduc
tions” on the grounds that they violated
public policy. How actively the treasury
agents may be following this case is a
matter of conjecture—I am told that in
the Louisville office of the agent in charge
none are presently pending. However, I
fully expect the Bureau to question and
to disallow in certain instances deductions
claimed in the case of a surgeon who has
paid over a fee to the physician who re
fers the patient to him. By whatever name
it may be called, it is merely another form
of “fee-splitting.” While fee-splitting in
some form may be quite prevalent among
members of both the accounting and legal
professions, I believe that it is neverthe
less frowned upon and that nowhere is it
specifically “approved.”
In the instance of the surgeon to whom
a patient is referred by the physician, I

believe that in order to safeguard the de
duction of a fee paid to the physician, the
physician should render a “service”; i.e.,
he should be present, and, if necessary,
actually assist the surgeon in the operating
room. While it is true that his presence is
obviously intended to be of benefit to the
patient, surely it is a plausible argument
for the surgeon to advance in support of
his deduction. I fully expect to see the
Bureau disallow some deductions of this
nature on the grounds that no service
whatever was rendered, there was no com
pulsion to pay the physician, and lastly,
if necessary, to extend this theory on the
grounds of the Lilly case.
The taxpayer’s position in this case was
simply that no public policy was violated
by these (oral) contracts—that there was
no statutory law or rules of professional
conduct condemning this practice. Tax
payer further argued that the practice did
not increase the cost of the prescribed eye
glasses and that the practice of secret kickbacks was so common and so widespread
that such payments must be deductible as
ordinary and necessary. This failed to
impress the Tax Court (Judge Leech) and
likewise the Fourth Circuit (Judge Dobie).
The Tax Court opinion states, “The ab
sence of constitutional or statutory law or
rules of professional conduct condemning
this particular practice is not enough to
support petitioner’s position.” And with
this the Court proceeds to legislate. The
opinion further stated, “It must be remem
bered that the fundamental principle with
which we are dealing here is not that of
the relationship between the parties to an
ordinary commercial transaction. We are
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concerned in this case with the relation
ship between physicians and their pa
tients.” At this point it seems difficult to
rationalize how this “relationship” can be
against “public policy.” The dissenting
opinion by Judge Arundell and the Fourth
Circuit’s opinion offer various descriptions
of the phrase “public policy.” Judge Arun
dell’s dissenting opinion gives the real
meat of the situation when he states
that “I am disturbed ... by the ma
jority opinion that a commission paid
by an optician to a doctor . . . may
not be deducted as an ordinary and
necessary expense on the ground that
this practice ... is unethical and con
trary to public policy.” He further states
as to revenue statutes, “They are none too
squeamish about how the income to be
taxed was realized. The profits of illegal
businesses are taxed the same as the profits
of legitimate businesses, and, as the tax
is based on net income rather than gross
income, the expenses incurred in carrying
on of the illegal business have been gen
erally allowed, as the purpose of the tax
laws is not to penalize a business because
it is one on which the law frowns” (Com
missioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467).
Heretofore, the public policy theory to
overcome the “ordinary and necessary”
requirement has prevailed in situations in
volving agents or employees of a govern
ment or its instrumentality—or has in
volved deductions of sums paid as bribes
or sums paid to perform an act specifically
forbidden by law, which courts have ob
viously balked at permitting. Judge Arun
dell’s dissent points out that “the Tax
Court should be reluctant to undertake the
determination of the question of what is
and what is not contrary to public policy,
both for the United States and for each of
the forty-eight states where the act con
demned as against public policy is not one
shown to be in violation of any law of the
land. This court in the past has taken the
position that it does not possess the right
to condemn undesirable trade practices as
being against public policy, etc.” Judge
Arundell’s gem is “What are deductible
items should be known to a taxpayer with
reasonable certainty under our income tax
system.” The dissent interestingly points

out that the Commissioner does not claim
that “expenditures of this sort fall without
the purview of this statute, and in his
brief in this case he does not argue that
the agreements between petitioner and the
doctors were contrary to public policy,
but, rather, that the payments to the doc
tors are not ordinary and necessary ex
penses in that they were voluntary and
incident to an unethical practice.”
The Fourth Circuit’s opinion condemned
the practice of kick-backs in some very
sharply worded statements holding that
the kick-backs “corrupt the fiduciary re
lationship between physicians and patients
and result in a violation of the duty of
loyalty, they are opposed to public policy
and, therefore, are not deductible as ‘or
dinary and necessary’ business expenses.”
The Court made itself crystal clear in its
statement, “We certainly will not lend the
force of any opinion of this court to sanc
tion, as an ordinary and necessary expense
of the optician’s business, the making and
carrying out of such unconscionable and
reprehensible contracts for secret kickbacks to a doctor.”
The Circuit Court’s opinion seems to
have its fundamental premise that it is
immaterial that the question may be one
of ethics rather than of law. Pursuing this
literal statement, it is not difficult to envi
sion the disallowance by the Commissioner
of fee-splitting among physicians or other
professional men. However, this theory is
certainly extending the more commercial
situation existing in the Lilly case and I
do not believe that the courts will follow
the Lilly case in a situation among mem
bers of a profession on the grounds that
“fee-splitting” is against policy.
The problem incident to these “kickbacks”—which are no more than commis
sions paid for securing customers—should
be compared with the Tax Court’s hold
ing in the cases involving “black market”
purchases—admittedly paid in violation of
OPA ceiling prices. The leading case is
Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948), Com
missioner’s appeal dismissed, CCA 5,
2/20/50, which involved the deduction
from gross receipts (as cost of goods sold)
the purchase of meats in OPA prices, and
the following exceeding T.C. Memo De
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cisions were decided on the authority of
the Sullenger case Clara Eugenia Piper,
Ethel L. Couch (both involving over-ceil
ing purchases of used automobiles), W.
Guminski (meat) and Colonial Rubber
Company, side payments in purchase of
used tires in excess of OPA ceilings. The
opinion in Sullenger, supra, observes that
Section 23 makes no provision for the cost
of goods sold but that the Commissioner
has recognized “as indeed he must to stay
within the Constitution, that the cost of
goods sold must be deducted from gross
receipts in order to arrive at gross in
come.” Judge Disney, dissents in this case
stating, inter alia, “Why an expenditure in
contravention of law, and of public policy,
should be permitted subtraction and thus
affect such taxation, is difficult to under
stand. On the broad question of public
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policy here involved, I think there is no
sound reason to distinguish the present
situation from those above covered.” (Em
phasis supplied.)
Another decision to be observed in con
nection with this subject is Jerry Rossman
Corporation v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d,
711, C.C.A. 2, 1949, reversing 10 T.C. 468,
involving the deductibility of a penalty,
voluntarily paid to the Office of Price Ad
ministration, as an “ordinary and neces
sary business expense.” The opinion, Judge
L. Hand, states, among other things, that
it is not a penalty, and “Second, we say
that, even if it was the payment of a ‘pen
alty,’ that is not a ‘rigid criterion’ of its
deductibility. Third, we say that there was
positive and compelling evidence that to
allow such a deduction would not ‘frus
trate’ the policies of the underlying act.”

Under what circumstances are the opening inventory and accounts receivable to be
included in computing income upon a change in the income-tax accounting method

to give effect to inventories and receivables (and payables)?

Another question which is being given close scrutiny by examining revenue agents

is that which arises when income is first computed by using inventories and receiv
ables following years in which such items were disregarded. The question of when the

opening inventory is to be included or disregarded upon changing accounting method
to reflect inventories where they have not been used previously is quite confusing

under the decisions of the Tax Court. The procedure recognized by the Tax Court

seems to be as summarized below:

1. If the books have been kept on the cash basis but the accrual method is required
to reflect the income correctly, the opening inventory is disregarded for the year in
which the accrual method is first used. Z. W. Koby, 14 T.C. 1103.
2. If the books are kept on the accrual basis except that inventories have not been
used, it appears that the Commissioner may not require the opening inventory to be

disregarded if he insists upon use of the closing inventory. Mnookin’s Estate, 184 F.
(2d) 89, aff. 12 T.C. 744; Robert G. Frame, 16 T.C. No. 73.
Some weight seems to be given by the Tax Court to the identity of the side initiat
ing the action for use of inventories after they have previously not been used. Tax

payers have lost in attempting to switch to the use of inventories by using the open
ing inventory for the year of change.
In the case of Cornelius J. Dwyer, decided June 29, 1951 (CCH Dec. 18, 426(m)),
the Commissioner was sustained in requiring the use of the accrual method for a

hotel and tavern business where sale of merchandise was an income-producing factor
but sustained the taxpayer in giving effect to the opening inventory where inven

tories had been taken and were recorded and available.
The subject is discussed in an article on page 109 of Research Institute Taxation

Report of July 5, 1951, under caption “Penalty for Wrong Accounting Method.”

16

Federal Income-Tax Panel
The Tax Court seems to give considerable weight to the method followed in keep

ing the books. In the case of Carver, 10 T.C. 171, aff. 175 F.2d 29, Carver had

kept his books on a cash basis for 16 years and then changed to the accrual basis.
The Court upheld the Commissioner in disregarding the opening inventory for the

year of the change. It would appear that if the taxpayer has used inventories in his
books but not in his tax return, the Commissioner would be denied the authority to

disregard the opening inventory if the Commissioner changes the method of account
ing to reflect inventories in accordance with the method used in the books. Also, if
the taxpayer used an inventory in his books and tax returns but used an incorrect

method of computing such inventories, the Tax Court might uphold the taxpayer in

using the correct opening inventory for the year of correction, particularly if the
Commissioner was the party who required the correction.
WILLIAM H. WESTPHAL

A taxpayer is often required to use the
accrual method of accounting because it
more accurately reflects taxable net in
come, although the books of account are
kept on a cash or hybrid basis. These are
usually cases in which inventories and
accounts receivable are material income
producing factors in which the Regula
tions and decided cases require the use of
the accrual method. On the other hand,
the taxpayer’s books may be properly
kept on the accrual basis while he erro
neously reports income in his return on
a cash basis. What is the result in the
event the Commissioner examines the ques
tion after the taxpayer had been report
ing erroneously on a cash or hybrid basis
for several years and decides that he
should be on the accrual basis? Under
such circumstances, how should the open
ing inventories and accounts receivable at
the beginning of the year be handled?
Actually, by setting up the opening in
ventories and accounts receivable in the
year of the change, the taxpayer succeeds
in eliminating this amount from taxable
net income entirely. On the other hand,
setting up the opening accounts payable re
sults in eliminating deductions that would
otherwise be allowed and this treatment
of the liabilities prevents the taxpayer
from ever being able to obtain this deduc
tion.
The decision in the case of Wm. Hardy,
17 A.F.T.R. 615, decided by the Second
Circuit, aroused considerable interest in
this question. Here a taxpayer changed

his books to the accrual basis and con
tinued to prepare tax returns on the cash
basis. The Commissioner decided that the
taxpayer should report on the accrual
basis because of the nature of his busi
ness, in which inventories and accounts
receivable were material income-producing
factors. In effecting the correction of the
returns to the accrual basis, the method
followed by the taxpayer in keeping his
books, he did not adjust the items of ac
crual at the beginning of the year of
change, but only at the end. The result of
this action was to pick up, in the year of
the change, the entire accrual of income
over the years.
A similar result followed in the case of
Carver, 10 T.C. 171, aff. 173 F2d 29,
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit. In this case
the books were likewise changed from a
cash to an accrual basis, but the returns
were filed on the cash basis, and the
change was made entirely within one year
by the Commissioner. To the same effect
were other cases in point, Michael Lovall,
Dec. 17, 790 (M) Plantea, Dec. 13, 946
(M), and Z. W. Koby, 14 T.C. 1103.
However, in the case of Mnookin’s Es
tate, 184 F2d 89, aff. 12 T.C. 744, a
different result obtained. Here the tax
payer was on the accrual basis on all
items with the exception of credit sales,
which he reported on a cash basis. The
Court held that the Commissioner could
not include in income of the year of the
change the opening accounts receivable
and disallow the beginning inventory. The
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reason this was not permitted was that
the taxpayer had not changed a method
of accounting, but it was merely necessary
that a correction be made in a consistently
followed method.
Also, in the case of Cornelius J. Dwyer,
Dec. 18, 426 (M) the Commissioner, while
upheld in requiring the taxpayer to in
clude inventories in computing net income,
erred in failing to allow a beginning in
ventory as a deduction, since there was
no change in method of accounting.
There seems to be much confusion in
the cases on this subject, but the following
principle appears to emerge therefrom; if
the taxpayer must be changed from one
method to another, the cash basis to the
accrual basis because the taxpayer had
been reporting by following the wrong
method, the changes would be made in
the closing inventories, receivables, and
payables, and not in the corresponding
opening items.
If, on the other hand, the taxpayer re
ports on the accrual basis and had been
consistently doing so, but omits an item
of consequence that should be taken into
consideration, the Commissioner must ef
fect his correction in the opening inven
tory, receivables, or payables, if such a
correction is indicated therein. This is an
oversimplification, however, and is subject
to certain modifications and qualifications.
In the case of an incomplete reporting
on the accrual basis, there may be some
difference in the result if the taxpayer him
self seeks to correct the errors. His very
action in doing so at the time the return
is prepared may indicate that he clearly
understands that preceding years, likewise,
should have been adjusted. It will, there
fore, be more difficult to convince the gov
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ernment that his presentation of the facts
of which he has knowledge has been com
plete and it may be contended that the
Commissioner has relied upon the tax
payer’s representations to his detriment.
Under such circumstances, it is possible
that the government may successfully re
quire that the opening inventory, or receiv
ables, be omitted and the entire income
adjustment be made in the year of cor
rection.
Since the penalty of a changeover from
a cash to an accrual basis may be ex
tremely severe if large receivables and in
ventories have been built up, several
alternatives may suggest themselves in
settling these cases administratively. The
question has often arisen concerning
whether or not Section 3801 can be ap
plied. There is considerable doubt that an
inconsistent position has been taken in
such a manner that a correction may be
effected by the taxpayer through the in
vocation of this section. It is possible, how
ever, if the results of the abrupt changeover are seriously inequitable, that an
equity settlement can be agreed to that
will result in a tax substantially as large
as the amount that would have been paid
had the taxpayer reported correctly on
the accrual basis for all years involved,
plus interest on this theoretical tax.
Also, in the case of a corporation in
excess-profits tax, the provisions of Sec.
456 pertaining to abnormal income should
be thoroughly explored in the year of
the changeover. It appears that it may be
reasoned soundly that such an adjustment
would represent abnormal income of a
type applicable to preceding years, and
not properly subject to excess-profits tax.

What is the situation with respect to capital gains on the sale of livestock used for

breeding or dairy purposes?
WALTER M. BURY

There has been considerable litigation
during the past few years as to the tax
ability of gains on the sale of breeding or
dairy stock of farmers, particularly in
those instances in which the sale of such
animals constitute a long-term capital

gain transaction under section 117(j) of
the Internal Revenue Code. Section 117(j)
was added to the Code in 1942 and pro
vided that the capital-gains rates would
apply to gains on sale of property used
in the trade or business of a taxpayer
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which was of a character subject to the
allowance for depreciation and to real
property held for more than six months
which is not property of a kind which
would properly be includible in the inven
tory of a taxpayer if on hand at the close
of the taxable year, or property which is
held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business. Livestock used for
draft, breeding, or dairy purposes and
held over six months is among the kind
of assets to which section 117(j) applies.
There are certain allowable procedures,
however, with respect to reporting farm
income for tax purposes, that are peculiar
to farm income accounting. One of these
is that a farmer reporting income on the
accrual basis can carry as inventory ani
mals which are used for dairy or breeding
purposes, whether purchased or raised,
even though such animals constitute cap
ital assets and are subject to the allow
ance for depreciation. The other one is
that a farmer is allowed to use the cash
receipts and disbursements basis for re
porting his income and does not have
to recognize as inventory the animals
raised by him. Expenses of raising such
animals are allowed as a deduction when
paid, and income is recognized when the
sales proceeds are received. As a result
animals raised for breeding or dairy pur
poses are carried at no value and have
a zero basis for computing gain or loss.
The Treasury Department early recog
nized these peculiarities of farm account
ing when it issued I.T. 3666, 1944 CB 270,
which provided that any livestock used
for draft, breeding, or dairy purposes, ir
respective of whether such livestock was
raised or otherwise acquired, is property
used in the trade or business, of a char
acter which is subject to the allowance for
depreciation and that this was equally
true whether the farmer keeps his books
and files his returns upon the cash receipts
and disbursement basis or upon the ac
crual basis. The Tax Court of the United
States in Isaac Emerson, 12 T.C. 875, was
of the same opinion. Accordingly, livestock
held over six months and used for breed
ing or dairy purposes should have the
benefits of section 117 (j) whether such

livestock was raised or purchased, whether
it was carried on the books as an inven
tory asset or a capital asset or, in the
case of a farmer on the cash basis with
respect to raised livestock which has a
zero basis.
The Commissioner’s main ruling on this
question, I.T. 3712, 1945 CB 176, held, in
effect, that breeding or dairy animals were
not section 117 (j) assets but rather that
the breeding and dairy herd as a whole
constituted such an asset and that only
gain on sales which resulted in a net
decrease in the herd after considering the
year’s replacements would constitute sec
tion 117(j) gains.
This ruling was overruled in March of
1949 by the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Albright v. U. S., 173
F2d 339, which held that gains on sale
of cattle used for breeding or dairy pur
poses and hogs used for breeding pur
poses and held over six months are taxable
as capital gains pursuant to section 117
(j) of the Code. The Tax Court then
handed down several decisions on this is
sue in favor of the taxpayer: Isaac Em
merson, supra, Leslie S. Oberg, 8 TCM
544, Fawn Lake Ranch Company, 12 T.C.
1139, Charles 0. Fritz, 9 TCM 81, and
others. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has joined the Eighth Cir
cuit and the Tax Court in holding against
the Commissioner on this issue in U. S.
v. John M. Bennett et al, 186 F2d 407.
On April 18, 1951, the Commissioner
issued Income Tax Release No. 3 wherein
he reconsidered his former position and
announced that the following principles
will govern the treatment of sales of dairy
and breeding animals:
“If the animal is used for draft or dairy
purposes—or in the case of a breeding
animal, if the practice of the taxpayer is
to hold such animals for substantially
their full period of usefulness—the ani
mal will be regarded, prima facie, as used
in the business of the taxpayer for the
purposes of section 117(j) of the Code.
“If the practice of the taxpayer is to
sell breeding animals before they have
served substantially their periods of use
fulness, such animals will be regarded,
prima facie, as held primarily for sale to
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customers in the ordinary course of the
taxpayer’s business, and not as property
used in his business.
“Under these principles, dairy or breed
ing cattle, horses, etc., will ordinarily
qualify as property used in the business,
and gain or loss on their sale will qualify
for the special treatment provided in sec
tion 117(j) of the Code. Animals which
are used only temporarily as breeders or
producers, including, ordinarily, hogs,
chickens, turkeys, etc., will not be re
garded as qualifying for such treatment.”
This information release was followed on
June 27, 1951, by Mimeograph 6660 which
revoked LT. 3666, supra, and LT. 3712,
supra, and stated the new position of the
Bureau as follows:
“It is the present position of the Bureau
that gains derived from the sale of dairy,
draft, or breeding animals are to be rec
ognized as coming within the purview of
section 117(j) of the Code if the taxpayer
establishes that the particular animals
sold were actually used for dairy, draft, or
breeding purposes for substantially their
full period of usefulness. If such animals
are sold prior to such full period of useful
ness, the taxpayer must show that they
were added to the herd for substantial use
in such herd and not temporarily with the
object in view of an early sale. Gains de
rived from the sale of breeding animals
which were used for the production of
only one offspring or litter of offspring
will not be subject to the capital-gains
treatment prescribed by section 117(j) of
the Code. Animals which are used only
temporarily as breeders or producers, in
cluding ordinarily hogs, chickens, and
turkeys, will not be subject to the capital
gains treatment prescribed by section
117(j).”
The Commissioner agrees with the
principle of the Albright case that gain
on sale of livestock used for draft, breed
ing, or dairy purposes is capital gain pur
suant to section 117(j). However, the
Commissioner requires that in order to
qualify as section 117(j) assets such ani
mals must be used for draft, breeding, or
dairy purposes for substantially their full
period of usefulness or that they must be
added to the herd for substantial use in
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the herd and not temporarily with the
object in view of an early sale. Apparently,
the Commissioner will allow section 117
(j) treatment of gains on usual or liqui
dating sales of culls from the dairy or
breeding herd. He, however, will not al
low a farmer to hold livestock until they
produce one offspring before selling them
and thus obtain capital-gains treatment.
There is judicial support for the Com
missioner’s position in Leonard C. Kline
et al v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 998. In that
case petitioners who operated primarily
a feeder ranch, purchased as feeder cattle
substantial numbers of Hereford cows
which had been bred prior to or after pur
chase. It was the petitioner’s intention to
hold the cows until after they had pro
duced a crop of calves and then sell them
as beef cattle. In disallowing section
117(j) treatment of the gain on the sale
of these cows, the Tax Court concluded
that the cows were primarily held for
sale to customers and that purchasing
the cows with the intention of harvesting
a single crop of calves from them before
putting them on the beef market did not
establish the cows as breeders as dis
tinguished from feeder cattle. The Court
distinguished the case from Albright,
supra, wherein capital gain was allowed
on sows which had produced only one
litter of pigs, by holding that Albright
followed a trade practice in the hog in
dustry, whereas there was no evidence in
the Kline case that there is or has ever
been any common practice in the cattle
industry of regularly selling cows from a
breeding herd on the beef market after
they had produced one calf.
Two recent Tax Court decisions have
ruled on the difficult question of deter
mining when a young animal becomes part
of the breeding herd. In the typical reg
istered cattle breeding operation young
calves are not just added to the breeding
herd and retained for their substantially
full production period. The more usual
practice is to sell some of the calves dur
ing their first year, some during their
second year, and others after they have
produced one or two calves. Only by such
gradual process of elimination are the
cows selected which are retained for their
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full productive period. The Commissioner’s
mimeograph ruling indicates that if the
taxpayer can show that the animal was
added to the herd for substantial use in
the herd, gain on sale of such an animal
prior to its full period of usefulness can
qualify as a section 117(j) gain.
In Walter S. Fox v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 854, promulgated April 20, 1951,
the Tax Court held that in the case
of a registered Aberdeen-Angus cattle op
eration, heifers raised, registered, and
sold by petitioners before they dropped
a calf should not be regarded as part of
the breeding herd and those animals that
dropped a calf while still owned by the
petitioners should be regarded as part of
that herd. Inasmuch as the evidence in
the case did not permit definite classifica
tion for each animal sold, the Tax Court
made a determination based on all evi
dence that registered heifers 26 months
old or over and registered bulls 36 months
old or over when sold shall be treated as
having been part of the breeding herd.
In A. Harold Schmidt et al v. Commis
sioner, (CCH Dec. 18,353(M) entered
May 31, 1951) the petitioners also main
tained a registered herd of purebred Aber
deen-Angus cattle. Following the Fox case,
supra, and applying the formula used
therein to the evidence of the case the
Tax Court held that only animals over
24 months of age when sold are to be
considered as having been part of the
breeding herd.
In Joy G. Miller et al v. U. S. (U. S.
District Court, District of Nebraska, Lin
coln Division, No. 14-50 Civil, February
19, 1951) the Court held that in a ranch
operation consisting of breeding and rais
ing of beef cattle, gains on sale of heifers
which had been introduced to the breed
ing herd at fourteen months of age and
proved unsatisfactory for breeding pur
poses, were capital gains. This case is
more liberal than the above cases but the
taxpayer was able to prove to the satis
faction of the court that the animals had
been retained for breeding purposes.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the
courts and the Commissioner agree that
animals used for draft, dairy, or breeding
purposes constitute section 117(j) assets.

There is not such complete agreement as
to when an animal becomes part of the
breeding or dairy herd. The Commission
er’s present position is that the animal
must be used in the breeding or dairy herd
for substantially its full useful period or
that it was added to the herd with such
intention. The courts agree, with one ex
ception, that the production of one off
spring qualifies a cow as a breeder. This
would also apply to sows since using them
for the production of only one or two
litters is common trade practice. The ex
ception is the Kline case, supra, in which
it was held that feeder cattle which were
purchased for sale but were held over
for one crop of calves did not qualify
as breeders.
A discussion of the situation with re
spect to capital gains on the sale of live
stock used for breeding or dairy purposes
should consider pending legislation on the
matter. The Revenue Bill of 1951 (H. R.
4473) as reported by the Senate Finance
Committee on September 18, 1951, pro
vides that capital gain treatment under
section 117(j) would be extended to live
stock, regardless of age, held for draft,
breeding, or dairy purposes, for a period
of 12 months or more from date of ac
quisition. This provision would be ap
plicable to years beginning after December
31, 1941, except that the extension of the
holding period from 6 to 12 months would
be applicable only with respect to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1950.
Also with respect to taxable years begin
ning after December 31, 1950, livestock
would not include poultry except turkeys.
The Senate Committee Report on the Rev
enue Bill of 1951 states that new un
certainties have resulted from Mimeo
graph 6660 which the Bureau Agents
apparently are interpreting to mean that
only animals which have completely out
lived their usefulness can qualify for the
capital-gains treatment, and that under
the Committee’s bill section 117(j) will
apply to livestock used for draft, breed
ing, or dairy purposes, and to turkeys
used for breeding purposes, whether old
or young; and the holding period will
start at the date of acquisition, not with
the date the animal or fowl is put to

Tax Problems Being Met in Today's Mobilization Economy
such use. If this provision becomes law
it should help to clarify the question of
capital gains on livestock.
The effect of section 117(j) on the
income-tax liability of farmers reporting
income on the cash receipts and disburse
ments basis as compared to those using
the inventory method warrants comment.
Can a farmer who uses the inventory meth
od of accounting for farm animals ob
tain as much benefit from the capital
gains provision as a farmer who uses the
cash basis? If the farmer is on the cash
basis, an animal that is raised has an
adjusted cost basis of zero and if it qual
ifies as a capital asset, then the entire
sales price is long-term capital gain. If
the farmer is on the inventory basis and
has included the animal in his inventory,
then such amount apparently becomes the
adjusted cost basis and reduces the amount
of the long-term capital gain, thereby
placing such a farmer at a disadvantage
in comparison with a cash basis farmer.
This is a disadvantage that must be
taken into consideration in counseling a
farmer to adopt the accrual basis for
income reporting. However, what can a
farmer who already is on the inventory
method do in order to get the maximum
tax benefits on his sale of breeding or
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dairy stock which qualify as section 117
(j) assets? One possibility would be to
adopt that inventory method which would
result in the lowest inventory value; for
instance, a farmer using the farm-price
inventory method could obtain permission
to change to a unit-livestock-price method
establishing as low a normal unit cost
as is practicable. Another possibility is
to retain the dairy and breeding animals
in the inventory until they reach maturity
and then to transfer them to a capital
account and depreciate them. Moreover,
all purchased dairy and breeding animals
should be capitalized and depreciated
rather than added to the inventory. Final
ly, the one sure way to secure equality in
tax on such gains between farmers using
the two methods of accounting for farm
income would be for a farmer using the
accrual method to obtain permission to
change to a cash receipts and disburse
ments basis providing such permission
could be obtained.
(Section 324 of the Revenue Bill of
1951 as reported by the Senate Finance
Committee was enacted into law as section
324 of the Revenue Act of 1951 with the
exception that turkeys like other poultry
were excluded from the definition of live
stock.)

What tax accounting procedure is applicable to payments to a corporation by an

officer, director, or shareholder pursuant to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934?
CHARLES N. WHITEHEAD

Section 16(b) of the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934 requires that profits
from a purchase and sale of a corpora
tion’s stock by officers, directors, or cer
tain classes of shareholders, within a six
months’ period be paid to the corporation.
The purpose of this section was to remove
the profit from speculation by insiders
who were presumed to have access to in
side information. The order of purchase
and sale is unimportant; the amount to
be paid to the corporation is the dif
ference between the highest sale price and
the lowest purchase price within six
months’ period. The payment has no re

lation to taxable income and cannot be
based upon identification of stock sold.
Moreover, the payment may be, and usu
ally is, required in a year subsequent to
the year of purchase and sale.
The tax treatment of such payments
by the individual and by the corporation
has never been adjudicated, nor have
formal rulings been issued by the Bu
reau. Interesting problems are present on
both sides; namely, whether the payment
is a deduction to the taxpayer and whether
its receipt is income to the corporation.
The individual’s problem is complicated
because the payment has no real relation
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to taxable income reported on the sale,
and the payment may or may not occur
during the taxable year of sale. It would
seem that the payment could not be an
adjustment of the sale price or affect
the capital gain or loss on the sale, be
cause of the completely different basis
of computation of the taxable gain and
the repayment. The taxpayer will have
sustained a capital gain or loss based on
the sale price and cost of shares held and
sold, and the repurchase at a different
price can hardly affect the gain or loss
realized for tax purposes. It seems equally
clear that the amount paid should not be
considered as additional cost basis of the
shares repurchased, because it has no re
lation to the stock repurchased. Accord
ingly, it appears that the payment must
be in the nature of an expense in the year
of payment.
Assuming that the payment is an ex
pense and that it is deductible, there
remains the question as to whether it is
deductible as an ordinary deduction, prob
ably under Section 23(e), or whether it
should be treated as a capital loss. In
cases where the payment is made in a
year different from the year of reporting
the gain, the principle of the Switlik case,
(13 T.C. 121 affd. CA-3) should be applic
able. While the Bureau has nonacquiesced
the Switlik case, and hence would disa
gree with its application, the courts have
held in similar situations that such pay
ments result in ordinary deductions. If the
Bureau’s interpretation of the Switlik case,
insofar as I understand it, is considered
applicable, the individual would be al
lowed at most a capital loss in the year
of repayment.
The foregoing assumes that the pay
ment would result in some sort of a de
duction. Apparently there have been no
published rulings by the Treasury De
partment on the question, but there are
unpublished Bureau rulings to the effect
that no deduction whatever is allowable
to the individual on the theory that the
payment is in the nature of a penalty and
therefore nondeductible. Apparently this
interpretation is being litigated in the case
of William F. Davis, Jr. now pending be
fore the Tax Court. It is difficult to see

how the Bureau can contend that the pay
ment is a penalty. As I read the law, the
individual coming within its scope is re
quired to pay the profit to the corpora
tion, providing that he performs certain
prescribed acts. The intent is to discour
age the use of inside information for spec
ulative purposes by removing the profit
from such speculation, and no penalty
other than the repayment of the money
results from the application of the stat
ute. Under such circumstances it seems
that the Bureau’s theory of penalty is far
fetched and untenable.
The situation with respect to the cor
poration likewise has had no assistance
from the Bureau or the courts. The cor
responding questions are whether the re
ceipt by the corporation is taxable as
ordinary income, capital gain, or nontaxable on the theory of a capital con
tribution or the receipt of punitive dam
ages. Certainly the corporation has done
nothing to earn the income; the income
has flowed to it by reason of the inde
pendent action of an individual. It is dif
ficult to see how such a receipt comes
within the scope of Section 22(a), or
within the definition of income in such
cases as Eisner v. Macomber (252 U.S.
207). If it is income it would appear to
be ordinary income, because the sale or
exchange required for a capital gain was
by another taxpayer. Likewise, it would
seem to be excess-profits income unless
it could be excluded as abnormal income
under Section 456.
It is hard to see how the receipt can
be classified as a capital contribution, be
cause the individual may or may not be
a stockholder at the time of repayment
and there is no intent to contribute to
capital. It has many of the attributes of
a gift to the corporation; however, the
lack of donative intent and the involuntary
nature of the payment is such as to make
the gift theory difficult to substantiate. An
other possibility is that the receipt by
the corporation of a penalty, assuming that
the Bureau’s treatment of the payment as
a penalty is correct, does not result in
taxable income to the corporation. Cases
involving punitive damages and receipts
of penalties may be applicable, and in
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those cases the courts have held that such
damages do not constitute taxable income
to the receiving taxpayer. (E.g. Central
Railroad 79 Fed 2d 697, Highland Farms,
42 B.T.A. 1314).
The situation then is one in which the
Bureau should publish an indication of
its position. At the present time appar
ently the Bureau is taking the harsh posi
tion that payments are not deductible to
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the individual but constitute income to the
corporation. Under such circumstances it
is apparent that taxpayers must take the
exact converse and contend that the pay
ments are deductible as ordinary deduc
tions, and that the corporation realizes no
taxable income on receipt. It seems likely
that prolonged litigation will result unless
some rational and equitable ruling is an
nounced by the Bureau.

What is tax accounting procedure for advertising funds which are subject to ex
penditure by the vendee?

Some manufacturers and wholesalers are using advertising plans under which the
customer deposits a sum for each unit of merchandise with the vendor as an adver

tising fund. Under the terms of the contract the vendor becomes liable for an equal
amount. The vendee has full authority to expend the funds for advertising purposes
subject only to the requirement that the advertising must be in conformity with the

vendor’s general policy against unethical advertising. Typical provisions covering the
types of advertising which are ineligible for reimbursement out of such funds are
the following:
1. Containing statements that are misleading or untruthful, regardless of intention.
2. Containing statements that are derogatory to other makes of products or to

other manufacturers.
3. Offering company’s products for sale at other than the suggested retail selling
prices.

4. Offering premiums in connection with sale of company’s products even though
price of company’s products is raised to include premium. This does not apply to

authorized combination sales of company’s products.
5. Illustrating models which are not identified by model number and retail price
when featuring the price of another model.

6. Violating any Governmental regulations.

Such plans ordinarily provide that upon termination of the agreement between
vendor and vendee one-half of any unexpended portion of the combined fund shall

be distributed to the vendee and the vendor shall be released from any further
obligation.
In the appeal of the 7-Up Company, 14 T.C. 965, the Tax Court held that sums
deposited by customers under such a plan did not constitute income to the vendor.
Questions apparently needing clarification include the time for deduction of such
advertising appropriations by the vendor and also by the vendee. Is the vendee
entitled to any deduction at the time of his deposit with the vendor? And is the

vendor entitled to a deduction for his liability to match the vendee’s deposit at the

time of the deposit or only at the time the ultimate advertising expenses accrue?
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HAL CANARY

answer to this question depends
pliance distributor clients argue that when
to some extent on whether we are
remittance is made to the manufacturer
doing the tax accounting for the manufor
 the advertising reserve, it is an ex
facturer, the distributor, or the retailer.
pense at that time. However, neither good
In the typical case the manufacturer
accounting nor good tax accounting will
invoices the distributor for advertising on
countenance such treatment. The distribu
a per-unit basis, or sets aside a reserve
tor’s advertising expense is not necessarily
for advertising based on the distributor’s
related to his purchases. For example,
purchases. In either case the funds are
during the shortage of appliances most
held in reserve for the distributor’s use.
of the distributors carried large advertis
ing funds with the manufacturers. Now
In the case of a per-unit charge to the
distributor, the amount is sometimes
these funds are pretty well exhausted.
matched by the manufacturer.
Nor is the expense based on sales. Few
There is a little question that the
distributors allocate a reserve to each
customer based on the sales to that cus
amounts charged the distributor should
tomer. However, in the face of the excess
be treated as customers’ deposits for good
accounting and good tax accounting. 7-Up profits tax 18¢ dollar, some distributors
Company, 14 T.C. 965; Broadcast Meas have found their claims from customers
for advertising funds increasing to the
urement Bureau, Inc., 16 T.C.----- , No.
122.
point where some limitation may have to
As for the reserve set aside by the
be applied.
manufacturer, good accounting practice
During the year, most distributors follow
and tax accounting seem to point to dif the practice of setting upon their books
ferent directions. The manufacturer has
“credits due from vendors” at the time
definitely committed himself to make cer the claims are filed with the manufacturer.
tain disbursements based on the sales
At the same time the retailer is credited
made, and good accounting would require
with the claim he has made against the
that the expense be taken in the year in
distributor. When the claim is honored
by the manufacturer, the credits due from
which the applicable income was earned.
However, the taxing authorities can on
vendors will clear out and the distributor’s
occasion be very realistic, and they know
share of the expense will be transferred
that if the distributor’s franchise is can from advertising reserve to advertising ex
pense. If at the end of an accounting
celled, the amount paid by the distributor
will be refunded, and the amount set
period the manufacturer has been dilatory
aside by the manufacturer will never be
in honoring the claims, and if there is
paid out. Consequently, for tax purposes,
evidence that the claims will be honored,
it is established that deduction may not
there should be included in the income
be taken for reserves set up for contingen statement the expense of the distributor
cies. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193.
as shown by claims filed.
Although some of the advertising fund,
The retailer’s problem is simple. If he
is a small dealer, he probably charges
as well as the manufacturer’s reserve, may
be used for direct advertising or sales
his advertising costs directly to expense
promotion by the distributor, the major
and takes credit for the allowance from
the distributor when it is received. A yearportion of the amounts are passed on to
the retailers in cooperative advertising end audit should take as a credit against
advertising any valid claims filed with the
plans.
Probably most of us have had our ap distributor.
he

T

What pitfalls are to be avoided in transactions involving a sale and lease-back and
gift with lease-back?

During recent years there have been many transactions involving the sale of plant
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properties of large insurance companies accompanied by a lease-back to the seller for

a term of years. Under some of these transactions the deductibility of the rent has
been questioned. Also, where the transaction has resulted in a loss to the seller,
question arises regarding the deductibility of such loss.

Similarly, numerous transactions have involved a gift of business properly to
related persons accompanied or followed by a lease-back to the transferor.
RUSSELL S. BOCK

This is too big a question to answer
adequately in a few words, but I shall
try to cover a few salient points. In the
first place, I’ll divide it into two parts,
because an ordinary sale and lease-back
is not the same as a gift with lease-back.
The ordinary sale and lease-back in
volves the sale of plant properties to in
surance companies, charitable organiza
tions, or others, accompanied by a leaseback to the seller for a term of years.
There are two important tax questions:
(1) can the seller deduct a loss on the
sale, and (2) are the rentals fully de
ductible?
As to deduction of a loss, the Tax
Court has passed on this question in three
recent cases. In Standard Envelope Man
ufacturing Co., 15 T.C. 41, and in May
Department Stores Co., 16 T.C. No. 67.
losses were allowed. The Commissioner
has acquiesced in both of these cases. In
Century Electric Co., 15 T.C. 581, a loss
was disallowed, on the ground that the
sale was in substance a tax-free exchange
of a fee interest in real estate for a lease
hold interest running over 30 years. The
regulations have long provided that a
leasehold for 30 years or more is property
of “like kind” to a fee interest. In both
cases where losses were allowed the lease
was for less than thirty years.
The question of the deductibility of the
rentals in the type of sale and lease-back
deal which has been common in recent
years apparently has not yet been litigated.
However, we have some guidance in cases
such as Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25, and
Chicago Stoker Corp., 14 T.C. 441, where
rentals and royalties were disallowed on
the theory that the lessee was acquiring
an equity in the property. In those cases
the Court laid down the rule that the
lessee is acquiring an equity if the rental
payments exceed the depreciation in value

of the property. I don’t think this appar
ently simple rule can be applied in every
case, but it is an indication of the Tax
Court’s attitude.
Where the lease provides for a very
high rental in the later years, it is con
ceivable that a portion of the rent might
be disallowed in the early years and allo
cated to the later years of the lease. We
have no cases on this point to date, but I
think this possibility should not be Over
looked.
A study of authorities suggests the fol
lowing rules which should be followed, if
possible, to obtain favorable tax treatment
of sale and lease-back transactions:
1. The sale price should be fair and
reasonable.
2. The lease should be for a period of
less than 30 years.
3. There should preferably be no re
newal option in the lease.
4. There should preferably be no repur
chase option in the lease.
5. If the lease includes options to re
new or to repurchase, the options
should be for reasonable amounts,
based upon the best possible estimate
of values at the time the option may
be exercised.
6. The staggering of rates within the
lease period should be kept within
reasonable limits; in other words, an
attempt should be made to avoid an
unreasonably high rental for the first
few years with a reduction to an un
reasonably low rental for later years.
7. The lessee should be prepared to es
tablish the amount of interest and
depreciation that should be allowed,
if it is held that the transaction is
essentially a loan or a purchase ar
rangement and the rents are dis
allowed.
The gift and lease-back presents quite
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different problems. These situations in
volve some of the same questions as the
family partnership and family trust cases.
The authorities are conflicting, with the
cases being decided largely on the basis
of their own special facts. The decisions
seem to look with disfavor on transactions
where the property is given to the wife or
children who are not independent in their
business affairs. They also frown upon
arrangements where the rentals are pure
ly arbitrary and are fixed by the donor of

the property in excess of a fair rate.
It appears that a gift and lease-back
arrangement has little chance of success
unless the property is given away outright
with no strings attached and unless the
parties bargain for the lease on an arm’s
length basis. This is often difficult to ac
complish in the type of family situation
which is usually involved in a gift and
lease-back transaction. It is possible that
the new family partnership rules will have
some effect on these transactions.

Is taxpayer entitled to the benefit of capital-gain rates on sale of fully depre

ciated assets?
Revenue agents are taking the position that if the cost of an asset has been fully
recovered through depreciation deductions, the proceeds from the sale thereof are
taxable at ordinary rates instead of capital gain rates. Their theory is that if 100

per cent depreciation has been taken, it must be presumed that the asset has been
retired from use, whether or not it is in actual use, and that, accordingly, such asset
no longer qualifies as a depreciable asset used in the business and thus does not
qualify as a capital asset under Section 117(j), I.R.C.
If the position of the revenue agents is correct, it is evident that it is highly impor

tant for accountants to give careful attention to depreciation deductions in order to
avoid complete depreciation of assets in actual use.

W. WALLER GROGAN

It appears that revenue agents are tak
ing the position that where the cost of
an asset has been fully recovered through
depreciation, the proceeds from the sale
(whether or not held more than six
months) are to be treated as ordinary in
come rather than capital-gain income.
Their theory appears to be that if 100
percent of depreciation has been claimed,
it must be conclusively presumed that the
asset was retired from use, whether or not
it is in actual use, and therefore the as
set does not qualify as one “depreciable”
used in the trade or business and does not
qualify under Section 117(j) I.R.C.
I do not think revenue agents are gen
erally taking this position, nor do I be
lieve they will prevail in that position.
The “key” word in this situation is “char
acter”. The statute, Section 117(j)(l) —
definition of property used in the trade
or business—states that “(it) means prop

erty used in the trade or business, of a
character which is subject to the allow
ance for depreciation provided in Section
23(L).” Though property may be fully de
preciated, if it is still in use or can be
used by the taxpayer—that is, held for
future use, and has not been abandoned,
the asset has not lost its character as
“depreciable”. It seems clearly wrong to
presume that because no further depre
ciation may be taken or allowed the
asset has been retired from use. It seems
equally true that the property would de
teriorate and therefore is of a “character
which is subject to the allowance for
depreciation”.
Two situations will ordinarily be found
with respect to fully depreciated assets;
(1) it will still be in use, or (2) it may
be retired from use but held by the
taxpayer for possible further use either
in an emergency or for salvage as spare
parts or components of the asset. In the
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latter situation, the leading case is Wil
son Line, Inc. 8 T.C. 394, 1947, acquiesced,
1947—1, CB 4. There, the taxpayer dis
mantled parts of a marine railway and
carried this on its books as an asset at
the estimated salvage value of $2,500 and
thereafter claimed no depreciation. It was
held in storage for future use and was
therefore property used in the taxpayer’s
business and (from the opinion) “was
of a character subject to the allowance
for depreciation and was not includable
in inventory or held for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of petitioner’s busi
ness.” In the alternative, the petitioner
argued that the asset, in its dismantled
state, was a capital asset held for more
than six months, since it was not stock in
trade nor property held for sale to cus
tomers in the ordinary course of business,
and therefore, in any event, was a capital
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asset, under Section 117(a)—if not under
Section 117 (j).
That the asset was not actually in use
is not conclusive. It is only necessary to
show that the asset “could have been used
by the petitioner.” Under such circum
stances it is therefore not conclusive that
because the property has been fully de
preciated, it no longer qualifies as “de
preciable” property.
The decision in Wilson Line, Inc., supra,
was followed by the Tax Court in Alamo
Broadcasting Company, 15 T.C. 541, 1950,
wherein the opinion stated, “we have pre
viously held that ‘used in a trade or
business’ means ‘devoted to the trade or
business’ and includes property purchased
with a view to its future use in the busi
ness even though this purpose is later
thwarted by circumstances beyond the
taxpayer’s control.”

Explain correct inventory procedure by automobile dealers for their used cars.

Increased attention by revenue agents is being given to inventory valuation of used
cars in the hands of automobile dealers. This question apparently involves basic

inventory principles but increased attention being given to the problem as it arises
in the audit by revenue agents of the returns of automobile dealers seems to warrant

some special attention at this time.
Undoubtedly many automobile dealers have understated their used car inventories
to their own detriment by causing the resulting income to be realized in later years

at higher tax rates.
WILLIAM H. WESTPHAL

Second-hand cars acquired by auto
mobile dealers as trade-ins should be
valued at bona fide selling prices less di
rect cost of disposition regardless of
whether inventories are valued at cost or
at the lower of cost or market. This rule
is set forth in Regulations III, Sec. 29.22
(c) (2), which provides that second-hand
goods should be valued on this basis.
As a practical matter, inventories of
used cars are usually priced in accordance
with the values shown in a list published
by the National Automobile Dealers As
sociation. This is then reduced by an off
setting reserve for reconditioning used and
repossessed cars. The net effect of such
treatment at the end of the accounting
period is to take the used cars into account

in the closing inventory at their market
value less the cost of disposition.
In the Lord Motor Company case,
5 B.T.A. 818, this estimated cost of dis
position was considered to be 25 per cent
of the sales price and in the average case
its range is between twenty and twentyfive per cent.
Before effecting a change in method of
computing inventories, it should be demon
strated satisfactorily that the inventories
are incorrect as to basic principle, and it is
well to bear in mind this cardinal rule—
that consistency in method is of great im
portance, but the perpetuation of gross
error on the grounds of consistency should
not be permitted.
But let us suppose that the method of
inventory computation is shown to be gross
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ly in error. What method of correction
may be followed? In cases involving in
ventory changes, we have situations in
which (1) the correction of the opening
inventory would reduce the tax, and (2)
the correction of the opening inventory
would increase the tax.
In the case of the former, we are likely
to find that if the preceding year is barred
by the statute of limitations, it will be
very difficult to effect the adjustment of the
opening inventory. There is a line of cases
involving the application of the doctrine
of estoppel that can cause a taxpayer
undertaking such a correction the greatest
difficulty. The Commissioner can show that
the error is one of fact, that the taxpayer
was in possession of the true facts at the
time of the preparation of the return, and
that the Comm
issioner relied upon this rep
resentation to his detriment. Therefore, it
will be very difficult to persuade him that
he should now allow the adjustment. Inter
esting cases in point are those of Eureka
Fire Brick Works, 5 T.C.M. 998, and
Swift Manufacturing Company v. United
States 12 F. Supp. 453.
On the other hand, the Commissioner is
on sound grounds in insisting on an open
ing inventory adjustment where it works
to his advantage to do so, and is supported
by cases in point if he wishes to make this
change. His position under such condition
was supported by the Court in Commis
sioner v. Gooch Milling and Elevator Com
pany, 64 S. Ct. (1948).
What, then, can the taxpayer do to heal
a troublesome situation of this type and
establish his inventories once and for all
time on a sound income tax basis without
subjecting himself to terrific tax penalties?
It is suggested that, if a year is yet open
in which the tax rates are fairly low, the
correction be made in that year, adjusting
the closing inventory but not the opening

inventory. It is quite probable that the
government will permit the correction to
stand. If, for example, a tax return is
prepared for an automobile company that
sets forth grossly erroneous valuations of
used cars, and the current year looms be
fore the taxpayer as an excess-profits-tax
year, the oldest open years in the pre
excess-profit-tax days may be considered
as a possible place in which to make the
correcting adjustment, if it serves to in
crease the inventories. If the taxpayer is in
a 38 per cent bracket for the year 1948,
which is yet open, it appears that the cor
rection can be made in that year, leaving
the opening inventory unadjusted, but
changing the closing inventory.
Suppose, however, that the correction is
made by the Commissioner? In all prob
ability, he will not reduce the opening in
ventory to correspond with the closing
inventory if the previous year is barred by
the statute of limitations. What recourse,
then, will the taxpayer have to prevent the
imposition of an unjust pyramiding of tax?
Section 3801 has been suggested as a
possible remedy, but there is considerable
doubt that an inconsistent position within
the purview of that section is involved, al
though it has been applied administrative
ly, in principle, to prevent gross inequity.
It is possible, however, that an equity ad
justment may be worked out administra
tively so that the taxpayer will pay the tax
that should have been paid had the in
ventory been correctly computed for all
years. Also, in the case of a corporation
in excess-profits tax, the provisions of Sec
tion 456 pertaining to abnormal income
should be thoroughly explored in the year
of the changeover. It appears that it may
be reasoned soundly that such an adjust
ment would represent abnormal income of
a type applicable to preceding years, and
not properly subject to excess-profits tax.

Bringing the family partnership situation up to date. What are the recent Court

interpretations of what should constitute a family partnership? What can be done to

solve the problems which exist?
WALTER M. BURY

A large number of decisions on the
family partnership tax problem still leaves

uncertainties as to what types of plans will
be recognized as effective and what types
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are to be avoided. Explanation of two or
three of the outstanding highlights might
serve a useful purpose.
The Senate Finance Committee has
brought the family partnership situation
up to date by stating in its report on the
Revenue Bill of 1951, that the determina
tion of the status of a family partnership
under existing law has been extremely un
certain and that a state of confusion still
exists with respect to the possible settle
ment of many cases pending with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. Our intention
is to review briefly the high spots of the
current situation.
Since the Revenue Act of 1948 allowed
splitting of the income of a husband and
wife for income-tax purposes, the family
partnership question does not have much
significance as to husband and wife part
nerships for years subsequent to 1947.
However, it does have significance for
family partnerships consisting of members
other than a husband and wife and also as
to husband and wife partnerships for years
prior to 1948.
Following the United States Supreme
Court’s decisions in the Tower and Lus
thaus cases (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Francis E. Tower 327 U.S. 280
and A. L. Lusthaus v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue 327 U.S. 293) which
were handed down in 1946, the Tax Court’s
approach to the partnership problem was
that it considered as essential to member
ship in a family partnership for tax
purposes the contribution of capital
originating with the member or substantial
participation in the control and manage
ment of the business or the performance
of vital services. It was not material that
the partnership was not formed for tax
avoidance purposes. The circuit court deci
sions apparently were more concerned with
whether the facts indicated that a real
bona fide partnership had been formed.
On June 27, 1949, the United States
Supreme Court gave further consideration
to the family partnership problem in its
decision in Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Culbertson, et al, 337 U.S. 733.
The Supreme Court stated that its deci
sion in the Tower case was misinterpreted
by the Tax Court and that the question of
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whether a partnership exists for incometax purposes is not whether services or
capital are contributed by a partner, “but
whether, considering all the facts . . . the
parties in good faith and acting with a
business purpose intended to join together
in the present conduct of the enterprise.”
Thus the Supreme Court shifted the em
phasis in testing a family partnership from
the contribution of capital and vital ser
vices test to the reality test. The question
which now must be answered is: Does a
partnership exist in substance as well as
in form?
There has been no indication, however,
of substantial liberalization on the part of
the lower courts as a result of the Culbert
son case. Although original capital and vi
tal services may not be considered as a
decisive test, nevertheless, they serve as
the best proof of an intention to form a
valid partnership. Tax Court decisions
since the Culbertson case indicate that the
formation of a partnership in order to save
income taxes through an intrafamily gift
of a partnership interest where the donee
performs no substantial services will not
result in a valid partnership for tax pur
poses. Just as in tax-free reorganizations
“business purpose” seems important. Some
of the Circuit Courts of Appeals appear
more liberal than the Tax Court. Thus, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s
recognition of minor children as partners
though they acquired their interests with
promissory notes and contributed no valu
able services. (Arnold v. Harry B. Green,
186 F.2d 18). The Tenth Circuit af
firmed a district court decision recogniz
ing a husband and wife partnership where
in a husband who was about to be sent
overseas by the armed forces gave his
wife half interest in several partnerships
in order to provide for her financial inde
pendence in case of his death (Schaaf
Baker v. Jones, D. C. Oklahoma 7-6-50,
affirmed CCA-10, 5-21-51).
The Tax Court, however, is not averse
to recognizing bona fide partnerships as
valid. The court recognized a son in the
armed services as a partner with his father
in a lumber business where the son was
made a partner and rendered valuable
services before he enlisted in the army, but
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it did not recognize as a partner the second
son who was made a partner after he had
joined the Navy (Joe Denton Harris, Jr. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 10
TCM 477). In Theodore D. Stern (15 T.C.
521) the Tax Court recognized trusts for
taxpayer’s wife and children as valid
limited partners in a partnership organized
under Illinois law.
The unfortunate aspect of the family
partnership problem is that it has not been
possible for owners of sole proprietorships
to give away property interests in such a
business to other members of the family
and thus to have the income attributable
to such property taxable to the donee
owner. Why this can be done easily with
respect to other assets, such as real prop
erty and stock and bonds even if the trans
fer is made solely to save taxes but not
with respect to an interest in a business, is
not understandable. The Senate Finance
Committee is fully aware of this particular
discrimination as is evident from its com
ments on Section 339 of the Revenue Bill
of 1951 in its committee report on the bill.
It appears that if the proposed section is
enacted into law a fair rule should be
established for the recognition of family
partnerships. To quote from the committee
report “. . . the bill provides that in
the case of any partnership interest
created by gift, the allocation of in
come, according to the terms of the
partnership agreement, shall be con
trolling for income-tax purposes ex
cept when the shares are allocated without
proper allowance of reasonable compensa
tion for services rendered to the partner
ship by the donor, and except to the ex
tent that the allocation to the donated
capital is proportionately greater than that

attributable to the donor’s capital. In such
cases a reasonable allowance will be made
for the services rendered by the partners,
and the balance of the income will be al
located according to the amount of capital
which the several partners have invested.
However, the distributive share of a part
ner in the earnings of the partnership will
not be diminished because of absence.
This amendment at the election of any
member of a family partnership is to be
effective with respect to any open taxable
year since December 31, 1938, but will be
valid only if any other members of the
partnership whose taxable income would
be increased or decreased consent to the
resulting adjustment of their tax liability.
Certainly, the enactment of this section
into law will not solve all the family part
nership problems. Partnerships to be re
cognized will have to be genuine and bona
fide and the gifts complete. However, it
should be a long step forward in placing
the family partnership on the same basis
with other property, recognizing that in
come from property which is the subject of
a completed gift is properly attributable to
the donee and that income from personal
services is properly attributable to the per
son rendering the services and is not as
signable for tax purposes to someone else.
(Section 339 of the Revenue Bill of 1951
as reported by the Senate Finance Com
mittee was enacted into law as section 340
of the Revenue Act of 1951 with the im
portant change that the amendments made
by this section were made applicable with
respect to taxable years beginning after
December 31, 1950. The retroactive appli
cation of the amendment to years begin
ning after December 31, 1938, was thus
eliminated.)

What procedure is applicable for accounting for income from royalties under a
patent acquired by inheritance?
CHARLES N. WHITEHEAD

Assuming a patent to have been valued
at $100,000 for the purpose of the federal
estate tax and to have a remaining life
of ten years, questions arise as to whether
such valuation is to be recovered for in
come-tax purposes by applying proceeds

against the basis until the basis is re
covered, by depreciation deductions, or
only to the extent resulting from applica
tion of section 126(c), I.R.C.
Revenue Agents have urged that the
applicable procedure is to allow deductions
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only to the extent permitted under Code
section 126(c). In support of such position
they cite the decision in the case of Estate
of Thomas Remington v. Commissioner,
9 T.C. 99, applicable to insurance commis
sions for personal services.
In the recent case of Estate of John W.
F. Hobbs v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 153,
(CCH Dec. 18,336) the Tax Court held
that the value of a leasehold as determined
for estate-tax purposes should be recov
ered for income-tax purposes by means of
amortization over the remaining term of
the lease. The Hobbs case involved a prop
erty value and not any factor of personal
earnings.
In a case involving personal earnings
for years 1941, 1942, and 1943, the Cir
cuit Court of Appeals (Second) held that
the value of an employment contract
which had been subjected to estate tax
should be amortized over the remaining
life of the contract. May D. Hatch v. Com
missioner, June 29, 1951, reversing and re
manding 14 T.C. 237.
Inherited rights under patents, includ
ing patents which have become the subject
of exclusive licenses of a type classifiable
as a sale, constitute property rights rather
than contracts for services. Regardless of
the procedure applicable to personal ser
vice contracts, it appears that the basis of
such a patent or exclusive license should
be recoverable for income-tax purposes
either by amortization deductions or by
applying the proceeds against the basis
until the basis has been recovered, as in
the case of Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404,
involving payments under a mineral lease.
Is section 126(c) involved to any extent
in the case of royalties from inherited pat
ent interests? And how can the decision
in the Remington case be reconciled with
the Hatch case?
In the case of Whitehurst v. Commis
sioner, 12 BTA 1416, (1928) the Board al
lowed depreciation on inherited patents to
be based on the estate-tax value. The
Commissioner announced nonacquiescence,
which apparently is still a hurdle for rev
enue agents although the technical staff
has recognized the propriety of deprecia
tion based on the estate value.
The question really covers two classes of
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patents and patent rights: (1) Patents
owned by decedent at the date of death
which had not been sold prior to death
and (2) patent rights in which the dece
dent had executed a sale or an exclusive
license tantamount to a sale under patent
law. It appears that the tax consequences
of the two situations are different.
It is my opinion that the heirs will be
entitled to annual depreciation deductions
over the life of the patent in which the
cost basis (i.e., the fair-market value of
date of death) will be recovered. Section
113(a) (5) provides that an asset has a bas
is to the heirs for income-tax purposes equal
to the fair-market value at the date of
death or the optional valuation date de
pending upon the election made in the
estate-tax return. The patent here con
sidered was owned by the decedent at date
of death and is a capital asset, hence
section 113(a) (5) should determine the
basis. This holding should follow regard
less of whether the patent was owned sub
ject to or without a license at the date of
death. Other than the Whitehurst case,
there appears to be no decided cases and
that case is nonacquiesced by the Treasury
Department. The reason for the nonac
quiescence is difficult to determine; the
case was an early case in which section
126 was not considered. On the other hand,
settlements apparently have been made in
the Technical Staff on the theory that the
taxpayer is entitled to a basis for the
patent and that the basis should be re
covered over the life of the patent.
The recent decision in the Estate of
Remington (9 T.C. 99) apparently has
been used by the Bureau as authority for
disallowance of a new basis subject to
depreciation. Instead, income from the
patent is held by the Bureau to be section
126 income. This treatment I believe to be
erroneous. In the case of Hatch (14 T.C.
237, affd. C.A. June, 1951) the decedent
was the owner of a contract with a cor
poration providing for annual payments of
$30,000 after his death for a period of ten
years. In the Hatch case the Tax Court
and the Circuit Court determined that the
estate was entitled to the fair-market value
of the contract as of the date of death as
a basis and that only the excess over such
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value received from the contract constituted
taxable income. In the Remington case, the
decedent was an insurance broker who had
arranged with his employer for a payment
based upon income from certain accounts
over a period of years in the event of his
death. When the amounts were received
after death, the estate took the position
that the agreement was tantamount to a
sale of a capital asset, but the Tax Court
held that the income, that is, insurance
commissions and renewals, was section
126 income.
It seems that the distinction between the
cases is that in the Remington case there
was involved only uncertain future income
which would be paid to the decedent’s heirs
if collected and that there was no sale
made to the decedent’s employers. The
Tax Court held that the arrangement did
not constitute a sale or exchange of a con
tract, but was merely a sharing of profits
which, had the decedent lived, would have
constituted ordinary income. Accordingly,
the Tax Court held that the income re
ceived by the decedent’s estate in the
Remington case constituted section 126
income. Apparently the estate would have
been entitled to a deduction for estate tax
had the estate been subject to federal
estate tax. In the Hatch case there was a
definite contract for payment of $30,000
per year for a period of ten years after
the death of decedent. This was a definite
and certain contract susceptible of valua
tion, and the Tax Court held that, to the
extent of its fair-market value as shown on
the federal estate-tax return, the estate
was entitled to recover its basis (the
estate-tax value). No reference was made
to section 126 in the Hatch decisions.
Thus, while the two cases may appear
inconsistent, the difference in decisions can
be rationalized by the essential difference
in the nature of the payments. In the Rem
ington case the payment was contingent
and uncertain; in the Hatch case the pay
ments were definite, certain in amount, and
completely susceptible of valuation. The
Tax Court held that the Hatch contract
constituted a capital asset of the dece
dent’s estate whereas the agreement in the
Remington case was considered to be dif
ferent. Parenthetically, the Circuit Court

held that the gain (i.e., the difference be
tween the total payments and the present
value at date of death) was to be spread
ratably over the life of the contract, and
the first payments were not to be applied
against the basis until the basis had been
recovered.
The rationale of the Hatch case appears
to be supported by the cases such as the
Burnett case (2 T.C. 897A) involving the
value of no-cost livestock as of the date
of death of the decedent. In such cases
the fair-market value of the livestock be
comes the basis in the hands of the estate
regardless of the fact that no income had
been reported on the livestock prior to the
decedent’s death and the entire expense of
raising such cattle had been deducted as
expense by the decedent during his life
time. In the Hobbs case (16 T.C. 153) the
Tax Court held that the date of death
value of a leasehold interest held by a
decedent lessee should be amortized over
the remaining life of the lease.
Accordingly, as to patents in which the
decedent had an ownership interest, even
though subject to a nonexclusive royalty,
it would appear that the decedent’s estate
is entitled to a deduction for amortization
over the remaining life of the patent equal
to the value established in the estate-tax
return. Based upon the Circuit Court’s
decision in the Hatch case, it would seem
almost certain that the recovery of such
cost basis would be over the life of the
patent rather than by application of royal
ties to the tax base until the tax base had
been recovered.
In cases where the decedent, prior to
his death, had transferred his patent rights
under an exclusive license to make, use,
and sell (See Meyers v. Commissioner, 6
T.C. 258) in a contract tantamount under
patent law to a sale, the situation appears
different. In such cases the decedent made
a sale for an indefinite consideration prior
to his death, and up to the date of death
the sale proceeds had not been received.
After death, however, it appears that the
gain on the sale comes squarely within the
provisions of section 126. Section 29.126-1
of Regulations 111 treats as section 126 in
come amounts received by the estate
where the decedent had made a sale of

Tax Problems Being Met in Today’s Mobilization Economy

property but had not received payment
therefor prior to death. Apparently under
Mim. 6490, the Bureau would contend that
the proceeds from such a patent sale con
tract were ordinary income for years be
ginn
ing in 1951; therefore, for such years,
the amounts would be taxable as ordinary
income under section 126 providing that
Mim. 6490 is substantiated by later court
decisions. In any event, whether the income
is capital gain or ordinary income
to the estate, and to the extent that
the value of the contract had been included
in the estate-tax return, the estate would
be entitled to an estate tax deduction.
In summary, it is my feeling that the
estate is entitled to depreciation on a pat
ent owned by the decedent at date of his
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death based upon the fair-market value
of the patent as of the date of death spread
over the remaining life of the patent. It is
my opinion that there is no statutory basis
for treating the income from such a patent
as section 126 income. Unfortunately, there
appears to be no decided cases covering
the latter situation, and only one old
nonacquiesced case on the first point. If
the patent has been sold prior to the date
of decedent’s death under a contract for
an indeterminate sale price or otherwise,
then it seems that the amounts receivable
under that contract would constitute sec
tion 126 income in the hands of the heirs
reduced only by the deduction for federal
estate tax provided by section 125(c) on
the estate’s income-tax return.
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What exemptions can the predecessor or the successor allow in reference to

the company earning experience in a complete take-over? What can be expected

taxwise in a partial take-over? What types of transactions can be considered to be
partial take-overs or split-ups?
J. S. SEIDMAN
[The material which follows is a part of the address given by J. S. Seidman. The initial part of
his presentation is unavailable, due to circumstances beyond our control. Editor]

if the succession takes
Let’s go to the phase of this inheritance
place within the base period? Well, and take-over that may have some more
for that purpose again let’s raise a few
appeal. In the first place, this entire
principles. The predecessor, when there is scheme that we are talking about merely
a take-over, is considered as if it went out deals with the problem of the determina
of business entirely and was born anew
tion of the exemption of the predecessor
the day after the take-over.
or the successor when that exemption is
Conversely, the successor is considered
figured by reference to the earnings ex
as if it suddenly acquired whiskers and
perience of either company, but you know
had the age and the vintage of the prede that there are some other ways of figuring
cessor company. But the point is that if the exemption. You can figure the ex
you remember that the effect of a take emption by reference to the capital invest
over is as if a successor goes back to the
ment of a company. You can figure the
life of the old company and the predeces exemption by reference to a $25,000 mini
sor, as of the day of the take-over is
mum. You can figure the exemption or at
reborn, you will have in your possession,
least figure the tax by reference to a fixed
the general ideas. It is really the infusion
maximum 62 per cent rate, without any
of tax hormones in the reverse; the pre worry or concern about the earnings ex
decessor acquires monkey glands and is
perience or the capital investment.
born anew, and the successor acquires
Obviously, where those factors are in
social security glands.
volved, then none of these provisions has
Now with that principle, we revert to
any meaning. On the other hand, look at
the original question: what happens when this interesting possibility: let’s suppose
the take-over takes place, we will say,
the predecessor company figures its in
in the beginning of 1948. Well, within the
vestment by reference to capital invest
framework of those principles, these con ment. When the predecessor company
clusions would logically follow and do
transfers assets to the successor, the fact
follow as a matter of law, that the suc
that it has to give up some of its earnings
cessor taking over in 1948, inherits the
experience doesn’t mean anything, because
predecessor’s earnings experience for 1946
it isn’t interested in earnings experience;
and 1947. The predecessor continuing in
it is figuring its exemption by reference
business in 1948 and 1949, has its own
to capital investment. On the other hand,
earnings experience in 1948 and 1949 to
a successor inherits an earnings credit,
make use of on its own.
an earnings experience over and above its
There are also some wrinkles that weave
own experience; it inherits from the
into this problem where I said an acqui predecessor a right to add to its own
sition is made for cash. It doesn’t come
revenues or earnings, the earnings ex
under the succession arrangement, but
perience of that predecessor without the
you can see that instead of acquiring for
predecessor losing that experience, or
cash, what might happen is this: a suc without that loss having any significance.
cessor first acquires all of the stock of a
So you have got an interesting play
predecessor and pays cash for that stock,
there of being able to organize subsid
and then liquidates the predecessor. That
iaries and being able to make transfers
is a complicated subject, which time does
from one company to another to the tax
not permit us to investigate further here.
profit of both. I point out that while this
hat happens

W
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mechanism deals with the inheritance of
earnings of the successor company from
the predecessor, there isn’t a correspond
ing inheritance of any net loss or any
thing. There isn’t any corresponding in
heritance of the unused credit carryback
or carryforward. Quite to the contrary, as
you all know, some serious problems can
arise about net losses and carryforwards
and carrybacks of unused credit when
ever there is a shift from one company
to another.
On the other hand, in spite of that,
there are some more interesting possi
bilities. Suppose you have a situation
where you have a subsidiary that has
higher earnings with a low exemption.
You have a parent that has high exemp
tion but low earnings. All you have to do
is shift one into the other, match the two,
have the parent company inherit the earn
ings of a subsidiary and make use of its
own exemption. The net result should be
a tax saving. As a matter of fact, you can
go much further. You can have the type
of situation that lends itself to interesting
tax possibilities. Suppose the subsidiary
is a Western Hemisphere company. It had
large earnings during 1946-49, but the
Western Hemisphere company pays no
excess-profits tax. The parent company
liquidates the Western Hemisphere com
pany into itself and inherits the earnings
though those earnings would never have
been the basis of an excess-profits tax
exemption. It adds those earnings to itself,
increases its own exemption, and then per
haps starts doing business through some
other company or in some other area
through a new company; a brand new
Western Hemisphere company, and again
there is considerable advantage in the tax
picture.
My own feeling is that this provision is
pregnant with many interesting tax pos
sibilities.
Well, so much for the complete take
over. Now, let’s consider the partial take
over, where there is an inheritance of
only part of a company. In the common
vernacular, that is referred to as splitups. More technically, what is involved
is that when one company transfers only
part of its assets to the successor com

pany and the transfer is made on the
circumstances that involve either a tax-free
reorganization, or where the transferring
company takes back an 80 per cent con
trol in the successor company, or it may
be a partnership that makes the transfer,
the typical outlet for it is perhaps the
organization of a subsidiary by a parent
company, with the parent company just
transferring part of its assets.
You also may have the type of situation
where one company transfers its assets to
two successors, or you can have a part
nership transferring to one or more cor
porations. In any event, inherent in what
is involved for our purpose and the key
note is that there has been a transfer to
a successor of only part of the assets of
the predecessor.
Now, let’s see what the effect of that is.
I indicated at the outset that with earn
ings following assets, the logic of the situ
ation was that when part of the assets are
transferred, part of the earnings are in
herited by the successor. How do you
measure that part? Well, the primary
mechanism is that the earnings being re
lated to the assets, the size of the inheri
tance by the successor is measured on
the basis of the relationship of the value
of the assets that it had inherited, com
pared with the total assets of the prede
cessor.
Now, we know from grim experience
that that raises value problems not only
of the assets that we see, but also the
intangibles. There must be an evaluation
given to good will if there be good will,
whether that good will be transferred to
the successor, or retained by the prede
cessor. In recognition of that difficulty,
and also in recognition of the fact that it
doesn’t always follow that earnings may
be related to the value of the assets at
any particular time, there is an alternate
mechanism permitted in the law, and that
is that the size of the inheritance by the
successor company can be measured in re
lation to the identified earnings of the
particular assets to which it has succeeded.
That is all very beautiful if it weren’t
for the fact that there was just one slight
“if” injected in the provision. You can do
all that to your heart’s content; you can
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have an agreement between the prede
cessor and the successor as to how much
earnings have been inherited by the suc
cessor; as I say, that is all very easy as
long as you get the Secretary of the
Treasury to participate and join in and
consent to that agreement.
Well, here again, as in the case of com
plete succession, I want to point out that
although there is a split-up of earnings
between predecessor and successor, there
is no split-up of net loss, there is no splitup of an unused credit. As a matter of
fact, one of the interesting things, one
of the things that sort of baffles me a bit
is that when a partnership transfers some
of its assets to a corporation, there is a
split-up for this purpose and there is an
inheritance of part of the earnings expe
rience of the partnership. On the other
hand, when a proprietorship makes a
transfer, there is no inheritance. A pro
prietorship for this purpose cannot be a
decedent, cannot be a testator, cannot be
queath anything.
Obviously, the way out, if you are seek
ing a way out of an intent upon having
a succession of earnings, is to have the
proprietorship first devolve into some part
nership and then have the partnership
make the transfer. But as we stand now,
there is the discrimination between part
nership and proprietorship, and I am not
clear that I understand why.
Now, let’s have some interesting ques
tions on the problem, and these, I think,
may have some appeal.
Question No. 1: If a transfer is made by
a parent company to its subsidiary of
assets, but the transfer is made into the
paid-in surplus of the subsidiary as dis
tinguished from the receipt of stock, does
that constitute a split-up?
If you read the law as it is written, the
answer is no, it isn’t a split-up, because
the law distinctly says that the transfer
must be for stock or securities. As a mat
ter of fact, it is very clear in the law that
they knew about paid-in surplus because
there is some technical provision that does
refer to paid-in surplus, but not in this
respect.
So that I take it that anyone who wants
to get around the split-up provisions, if
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the split-up would have an adverse effect
taxwise, could get around it by making
the transfer to the paid-in surplus of the
subsidiary instead of the capital stock.
We as accountants know that for prac
tical purposes there isn’t any particular
difference between capital stock and paidin surplus. I don’t know whether it was
intended by the law to create that differ
ence. I merely submit to you that reading
the law it reads, there is that difference.
Now, of course, if you are looking for
a way out on a transfer, or to avoid a
split-up, you can, in any event, do it by
transferring assets to the subsidiary for a
loan or open account of a subsidiary
rather than stock or paid-in surplus, and
that avoids a split-up.
Question No. 2: (This to me is a far
more significant and important one.)
When a parent company transfers only
cash to a subsidiary in exchange for
stock, is that a split-up? I am envisioning
the situation where you even have a new
subsidiary that is getting started, or an
old subsidiary that is existing and the
parent company financing it by transfer
ring cash in exchange for stock. I must
confess that I have rather dogmatically
answered to clients and others when I
was asked that question, “Of course it is
a split-up.” To begin with, under World
War II the regulation specifically charac
terized it as such, under the provisions
of split-up in World War II.
Secondly, the Bureau has several times
held that cash is property for the purpose
of measuring whether there is a contin
uing 80 per cent control. On the other
hand, I must also acknowledge that the
new regulations say nothing on this sub
ject, and very interesting is the fact that
I have with me a ruling from the Bureau
that holds that a transfer for cash is not
a split-up. Now if a transfer of cash for
stock is not a split-up, then here are some
of the interesting possibilities: a company
organizes a subsidiary. The subsidiary,
since there is no technical split-up in
volved, gets its own $25,000 exemption,
if Section 123 has been kicked out of the
bill. In any event, we will have the status
of a new company with all of the favorable
provisions that apply under the existing law
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as to new companies and that are likely
to apply if some of the Senate provisions
of the bill pass and the parent company
will still retain its own earnings expe
rience and be able to continue to use them,
which I rather imagine may be an inter
esting way of playing fast and loose with
taxes, but I suppose we have given up a
long time ago looking for a perfect tax
law. We had probably better reconcile
ourselves to the fact that we are going
to have taxes until death. As a matter of
fact, I have always been amused by the
fact that death and taxes have been placed

together as being conjointly in area. I
have always found a very distinct differ
ence between death and taxes, because at
least in the case of death, it doesn’t get
worse every time Congress meets.
Maybe you can get some consolation out
of the fact that Adam Smith, one of our
famous classical economists, once said
that taxation is a badge of democracy.
Well, if taxation is the badge of democ
racy, I can give you these reassurances:
this country of ours is safe for democracy
for a long time, and we are going to have
a mighty big badge to show it.

An explanation of the purpose of Part III of the Excess Profits Tax Act and its effects.
Section 471—what transfers does it cover? What does the term “incorporate liquida
tion” mean as used in Section 470 and 472? In what cases do the provisions of
these sections apply?
T. T. SHAW

I would like to comment on section 471
before section 470, as sections 470 and 472
both pertain to intercorporate liquidations
and should therefore be considered to
gether.
This section relates to transfers of
property by one corporation to another as
paid-in capital under the historical in
vested capital approach in transactions
where a substituted basis applies. The
corresponding provision under the asset
approach is section 441 (g).
The purpose of section 471 is to limit
the amount includable in invested capital
by the transferee corporation to the excess
of the amount of the transferor’s basis for
the property over any debt obligations
issued or assumed by the transferee or to
which the property was subject, or over
any money or the fair value of any other
property given by the transferee as part
consideration for the transfer.
The effect of this rule is to allocate the
basis of property received in an exchange
first to any consideration given by the
transferee other than its own stock, with
only the remaining portion of the basis
included as paid-in equity invested capital.
For example, if property with an ad
justed basis of $1,000,000 and subject to a
mortgage of say $800,000 were transferred

by one corporation to another as paid-in
capital in a transaction where a substituted
basis applied, the amount includable in
the transferee’s invested capital would be
limited by section 471 to $200,000.
Section 471 covers only transfers by
corporations and only transfers where a
substituted basis applies. The section
seems to be deficient in this respect. For
instance, nowhere does it say what you
should do where the transfer is by an
individual or a partnership in a section
112(b) (5) transaction, and nowhere does
it say what the rule is where a substituted
basis does not apply and property is paid
in subject to the transferee corporation
issuing or assuming a debt obligation as
part consideration for the transfer of the
property.
If no special provision is needed to
cover transfers by individuals and partner
ships, and no special provision is needed
where a substituted basis does not apply,
it raises a question as to why a provision
such as section 471 is necessary where
the transferor is a corporation or where
a substituted basis does apply.
Where property was acquired by one
corporation from another as paid-in capi
tal in a transaction which under the law
when it occurred did not qualify as an ex
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change with a carry-over of basis, but
subsequently, by reason of a change in the
law did so qualify, the law as of the time
of acquisition is disregarded and the ex
change is considered as qualifying for
the carry-over method of determining basis
if the property is still held in the excessprofits-tax year or, in the case of property
disposed of, if the law had been changed
when the disposition took place.
For income-tax purposes the law pre
scribes in all cases of a substituted basis
the usual adjustments for depreciation,
amortization, and depletion in respect of
the period during which the property was
held by the transferor. In most cases a
further adjustment must be made by in
creasing the transferor’s basis, as adjusted
for depreciation, etc., by the amount of
any gain recognized to the transferor upon
the exchange. An example of this kind is
the acquisition of property by a corpora
tion in connection with a reorganization.
Both of these adjustments may be differ
ent for purposes of section 471 from what
they are for ordinary income-tax purposes.
With respect to the period prior to the re
ceipt of the property by the transferee, the
adjustments are those prescribed for the
computation of earnings and profits. For
example, discovery or percentage depletion
are not taken into account in computing
earnings and profits, and consequently
they are not the kind of depletion to be
used in adjusting the transferor’s basis to
convert it into the transferee’s unadjusted
basis for invested capital purposes. Like
wise, the amount of any gain or loss recog
nized to the transferor upon the exchange
in question affects the basis to the trans
feree for invested capital purposes only to
the extent to which it is taken into account
in computing the earnings and profits of
the transferor.
The liabilities assumed, or the additional
consideration given by the transferee, may
in some cases exceed the basis of the
property it receives. For example, assume
that property with a basis of $600,000 has
a current value of $1,000,000, and is
subject to a mortgage of $700,000. In this
case the liability to which the property
is subject exceeds the basis of the prop
erty. In a situation of this kind section
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471 would require the daily invested capi
tal of the transferee of the property to be
reduced by $100,000 as a result of the
transfer; that is, by the excess of the
mortgage over the basis. The regulations
state that the daily invested capital may
be a minus amount after a transaction
such as this. If the transferor were an in
dividual or a partnership, section 471
would not of course apply. In that event
the transferee would seem justified in not
reducing daily invested capital in a situa
tion of this kind.
Section 471 is limited to transactions
wherein property is paid in for stock or
as paid-in capital, and consequently does
not apply to exchanges which constitute
intercorporate liquidations. These are cov
ered by sections 470 and 472.

Section 470
The term “intercorporate liquidation” as
used in sections 470 and 472 means the
receipt of property by one corporation in
complete liquidation of another under a
provision of law by which no gain or loss
is recognized to the recipient corporation.
Liquidations under section 112(b) (6) are
the most common form of intercorpor
ate liquidation. Also included are liquida
tions during consolidated return periods
since 1929. For years prior to 1929 liqui
dations during consolidated return periods
were considered taxable and so would not
qualify as intercorporate liquidations un
less they were erroneously treated as nontaxable when the liquidation occurred. In
that event even a pre-1929 liquidation dur
ing a consolidated return period would
be treated as an intercorporate liquida
tion for excess-profits-tax purposes unless
the taxpayer decided to take an inconsist
ent position and pay any tax that might be
due on the old liquidation.
A liquidation in connection with a re
organization other than a statutory merger
or consolidation should not be treated as
an intercorporate liquidation. This is be
cause such a liquidation is merely a step
in the reorganization and not really a
liquidation in the regular sense. (San
Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co. 28 B.T.A.
395.)
The provisions of section 470 apply
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only where the stock of the liquidated
subsidiary had a cost basis in the hands
of the parent company. However, before
concluding that stock of a liquidated
subsidiary did not have a cost basis, it is
necessary to study carefully the rules re
garding determination of basis, which are
set out in detail in the regulations per
taining to section 472, but which apply
also to section 470. It would be well to
note that stock may have a non-cost basis
for ordinary income-tax purposes and have
a cost basis under the intercorporate li
quidation provisions.
The general purpose of the intercorpor
ate liquidation provisions in so far as they
relate to cost basis stock, is to adjust the
invested capital of the transferee (parent)
for the difference between the basis of the
stock and the underlying assets attribut
able to the stock at the date 80% or more
control of the subsidiary was acquired. The
theory of this adjustment is that the in
vested capital of the parent company after
the liquidation should be the same as it
would have been if the parent company
had acquired the subsidiary’s assets di
rectly rather than by the indirect route
of first acquiring the stock and then ac
quiring the assets in liquidation. It is
the same line of reasoning as that followed
in the Kimbell-Diamond Milling case and
other cases dealing with acquisition of
stock for the purpose of acquiring assets.
The basis of the liquidated subsidiary’s
assets is, in effect, rewritten for equity
capital purposes, to conform to the basis
of the underlying stock and this rewritten
basis continues to be used by the parent
company after the liquidation for equity
capital purposes. Depreciation, depletion,
and amortization must be recomputed for
all periods after the control date where
ever necessary to conform to the rewritten
basis of the assets, but the recomputed
depreciation, etc. is used only for adjust
ing invested capital. In the excess-profitstax return it is the regular depreciation,
etc., and not the recomputed amount,
which is allowed as a deduction.
While section 470 relates to intercor
porate liquidations affecting asset ap
proach invested capital, it also may have a
bearing on the excess-profits credit under

the income method. If a cost basis inter
corporate liquidation occurred during the
last two years of the base period, the base
period capital addition could be affected
by it. If such a liquidation took place dur
ing an excess-profits-tax year it could have
an effect on the capital addition or capital
reduction. This is because the assets as
restated for purposes of the intercorporate
liquidation would have to be taken into
consideration.
In cases where the stock of the subsid
iary is held by the parent company with
a basis other than cost the rules regarding
restatement of assets upon intercorporate
liquidation do not apply.
A parent company which acquired some
of the stock of the liquidated subsidiary
by purchase and other stock on a non-cost
basis must make computations to restate
that portion of the subsidiary’s assets
which is allocable to the cost basis stock.
No adjustment would ordinarily be neces
sary with respect to the portion of the as
sets allocable to non-cost basis stock.

Section 472
Section 472 deals with the effect of
intercorporate liquidations on historical
invested capital.
In the case of cost basis stock, inter
corporate liquidations under the historical
method are, like those under the asset
approach, based on the substitution of the
parent company’s cost basis of the stock,
for the subsidiary’s basis of its assets.
However, there is an added feature of
reflecting by plus or minus adjustment
the increase or decrease in the subsidiary’s
net worth between acquisition of 80% or
more control by the parent company and
liquidation of the subsidiary. This plus or
minus adjustment is treated, for invested
capital purposes, as a recognized gain or
loss realized by the parent company on the
day after the intercorporate liquidation.
It is reflected in the parent company’s
earnings and profits for the particular year
and also in its accumulated earnings. In
the case of a cost basis intercorporate
liquidation, the Sansome rule does not
apply.
Where there is an intercorporate liquida
tion involving cost basis stock and it
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occurs in an excess profits-tax year, it is
advisable not to allow the liquidation to
occur on the last day of the taxable year
if a plus adjustment is involved, but to al
low it to do so if a minus adjustment
exists. For example, if a liquidation in
volving a plus adjustment occurred on the
last day of the taxable year, the plus
adjustment would be considered a gain
realized by the parent on the first day of
the next taxable year and so presumably
would not be includable in the parent
company’s accumulated earnings at the
beginning of that year and consequently
would not be includable in the parent’s
equity invested capital until the beginning
of the following year. By liquidating the
subsidiary the day before the end of the
year any plus adjustment will be treated
as a gain realized by the parent on the last
day of the year and so will be includable
in the parent company’s accumulated earn
ings (and equity invested capital) at the
beginning of the new year. Where the plus
or minus adjustment is large this point
can be important.
In computing the plus or minus adjust
ment in an intercorporate liquidation, the
transferee’s stock investment must not be
reduced by losses (if any) availed of dur
ing prior consolidated return periods. This
rule applies whether the stock has a cost
or a non-cost basis.
Where the subsidiary’s stock had a non
cost basis, the subsidiary’s assets are not
restated upon the intercorporate liquida
tion as they are where cost basis stock is
involved. However, any gain or loss on the
intercorporate liquidation is treated as a
plus or minus adjustment which is added
to or deducted from the parent company’s
equity invested capital. In this case the
plus or minus adjustment is treated as a
separate item and is not merged with the
parent company’s earnings and profits. In
addition, in the case of non-cost basis
stock the Sansome rule must be given
effect to. It could happen in a non-cost
basis intercorporate liquidation that there
would be a minus adjustment on the inter
corporate liquidation and at the same time
the parent company would have an addi
tion to its earnings or a reduction of its
deficit by application of the Sansome rule.
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In such a case the parent company would
have to make a further adjustment in its
invested capital under section 458(e) (3).
About the only case in which there can
be an intercorporate liquidation where
the parent company owns less than 80%
of the stock of the subsidiary is in the case
of a statutory merger or consolidation. If
one corporation owns stock in another
(whether or not more than 80%) and
the two are merged or consolidated in a
statutory merger or consolidation, the
transfer of the property of the corporation
whose stock was so held to the resulting
corporation is treated as an intercorporate
liquidation. The regulations, however, deny
a cost basis to the resulting corporation
unless, immediately after the merger or
consolidation, the shareholders of the
former parent corporation are in 80% or
more control of the resulting corporation.
The basis of stock of a subsidiary for
the purpose of intercorporate liquidation
computations is not always the same in
amount as it is for ordinary income-tax
purposes. The regulations state that it is
to be the basis for determining loss upon
a sale or exchange, adjusted by amounts
proper under section 115(1) for determin
ing earnings and profits. The implication
of the reference to adjustments under
section 115(1) is that section 472 requires
a new determination of the source of pre
liquidation distributions by the transferor.
For example, distributions which under
section 113(b) are to applied in reduction
of the stock basis, because made from
March 1, 1913 appreciation realized, would
not be so applied under this rule.
Anyone determining the excess-profitstax effects of an intercorporate liquidation
should be familiar with the following four
special adjustments: pre-control adjust
ment, post-control adjustment, transferee
adjustment to earnings, and post-liquida
tion adjustment. These adjustments are
technical, but they should be understood
as they can have a bearing on the invested
capital of the parent company after the
intercorporate liquidation of a subsidiary.
I believe the Treasury recognizes that
to apply the provisions of Part III literally
and completely, would in many cases be
impracticable and impossible.
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What are the purposes of Sections 463 and 464? What happens when an existing
corporation acquires all or part of the component assets of another corpora

tion? How must one treat differences in base periods when there is a transfer
between two corporations? How well does the law cover such a situation?
WALLACE M. JENSEN

When a corporation computes its excess
profits credit under the income method it
is permitted to include as a part of its
credit 12% of the hase period capital
addition and must take into account 12%
of its net capital addition or reduction
since the base period. If a Part II trans
action occurs during the last two years
of the base period or at any time there
after, and if the average base period net
income is determined under Part II, then
the base period capital addition and the
net capital changes to be taken into
account must be determined under the
rules provided in sections 463 and 464.
The rules provided in these sections and
in the proposed Part II regulations, which
were released on August 16, 1951, are
quite complicated but can be segregated
into certain basic provisions as follows:
1. Whether the transaction occurred
during the base period or subsequent to
the base period.
2. Whether the acquiring corporation
acquired all of the assets or only part of
the assets of the component.
3. Whether any part of the stock of a
component was purchased for cash or
other assets at or prior to the time that
the assets of the component are acquired
in a Part II transaction.
Rather than deal with the rules in the
order in which they are presented in the
Regulations, I believe that a clearer pic
ture can be obtained if the rules are con
sidered as they relate to three specific
types of Part II transactions. These trans
actions will be discussed in the following
order:
1. The typical situation where an exist
ing corporation acquires all of the assets
of another corporation.
2. The splitting up of an existing cor
poration into two corporations, involving
the transfer of assets to at least one newly
formed corporation.
3. The less frequent situation where an

existing corporation acquires only part of
the assets of another existing corporation
in a Part II transaction.
When the Part II transaction occurs
during an excess-profits-tax year of the
acquiring corporation the base period capi
tal addition of the component is added to
that of the acquiring corporation so that
the resulting base period capital addition
is the sum of the two separately deter
mined amounts. For the year of the trans
action, however, only a portion of the
base period capital addition of the com
ponent is taken into account, measured by
the ratio of the remaining days in the
year after the transaction to the total num
ber of days in the year.
If the transaction occurred during the
two years preceding the first excess-profitstax year, the base period capital addition
of the acquiring corporation is computed
by combining the yearly base period capi
tal of both the acquiring corporation and
the component. For instance, if the trans
action occurred during the first taxable
year preceding the first excess-profits-tax
year of the acquiring corporation, then the
yearly base period capital of the compon
ent for both the first and second preceding
years are added to the corresponding items
of the acquiring corporation. Where the
transaction took place in the acquiring cor
poration’s second preceding taxable year,
only the yearly base period capital of the
component for its second preceding year
is taken into account.
The Regulations (Sec. 40.464-1 (b) (4) )
provide that, if the transaction occurred
prior to July 1, 1950, it is then necessary
to determine constructive taxable years
ending after the transaction; that is, the
component is deemed to have as many
taxable years as are necessary for it to
have a first excess-profits-tax year so that
what would have been its first excess-pro
fits-tax year and two immediately preced
ing years can be identified. Wherever it
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is necessary to determine a yearly base
period capital for any constructive date
after the Part II transaction, the amount
is to be determined as of the day of the
transaction.
Perhaps an example will better illustrate
how these rules are applied. We are deal
ing with the situation where an existing
corporation acquires all of the assets of a
component, and let us assume that both
corporations were in existence during the
entire last half of the base period and are
on a calendar year basis. Then, if the
transaction occurs after January 1, 1950,
the separate base period capital additions
of each corporation are combined. If the
transaction occurred in 1949, then we com
bine the separate yearly base period capi
tal as of January 1, 1948, and as of
January 1, 1949. If the transaction occur
red in 1948, we combine only the separate
yearly base period capital as of January 1,
1948.
But suppose these two corporations had
different taxable years. Assume that Cor
poration A is the acquiring corporation
and is on the calendar year basis but that
Corporation B, the component, had a fis
cal year ended June 30; then the result
would depend upon the time of the trans
action. The several possibilities would be:
Assume that the Part II transaction oc
curs after July 1, 1950, i.e., after the
beginning of the first excess-profits-tax
year of both corporations. Then the sep
arate base period capital additions of the
acquiring corporation and of the compo
nent are combined to obtain the base
period capital addition of the acquiring
corporation for any taxable year there
after.
Assume that the Part II transaction oc
curs on April 1, 1950, i.e., after the begin
ning of the first excess-profits-tax year
of the acquiring corporation but during
the first taxable year of the component
corporation immediately preceding the first
excess-profits-tax year which the compo
nent is deemed to have. Then the base
period capital addition to be combined
would be separately determined using the
following dates:
Corporation A: 1/1/48,1/1/49, and 1/1/50
Corporation B: 7/1/48, 7/1/49, and 4/1/50
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Assume that the Part II transaction oc
curs on April 1, 1949, i.e., during the first
preceding taxable year of the acquiring
corporation and during the second preced
ing taxable year of the component. Then
the separate yearly base period capital
would be combined as follows:
Corporation A: 1/1/48, 1/1/49, and 1/1/50
Corporation B: 7/1/48, 7/1/49 ----------The component may have been a sub
sidiary or an affiliated corporation and,
therefore, the Regulations (Sec. 40.4641(c)(1)) provide rules for excluding in
tercompany transactions. Although there
appears to be no specific statutory pro
vision in section 464, comparable to sec
tion 463(a) (7) which leaves the rules for
intercorporate transactions to be deter
mined by regulations, the need for them
is evident. The Regulations provide that,
in computing the yearly base period capi
tal of either corporation, the intercompany
stock holdings are to be excluded from
equity capital and inadmissible assets.
Likewise, daily borrowed capital, the re
lated interest adjustment, and the loans
to members of a controlled group are de
termined as if the indebtedness between
the two corporations did not constitute
borrowed capital.
The intent of the Regulations seems to
be that the acquiring corporation and the
component are treated as a unit and that
all intercorporate transactions are to be
disregarded as would be the case if con
solidated financial statements were pre
pared. However, where the two corpora
tions had different taxable years and as a
result the yearly base period capital of
each is determined as of a different date,
then the amounts to be excluded from
each corporation may not be identical.
Just what the result might be in any given
case would depend upon the facts, but it
would seem that the rules may have to
be mixed with a little common sense in
their application to obtain an equitable
result.
Where the transaction occurs after the
base period and the general rule is that
the separately determined base period
capital additions of each corporation are
then combined, the Regulations are not
clear as to whether such amounts should
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be redetermined on the basis of eliminat
ing intercorporate transactions. It is my
thought that it should be done. Take, for
instance, a situation where all of the bor
rowed capital of a subsidiary consisted of
loans from its parent corporation. In that
case the base period capital addition of
the subsidiary has been penalized by an
interest adjustment on borrowed capital
but no corresponding offsetting interest
adjustment has been permitted to the par
ent even though its yearly base period
capital has been reduced because of the
loan to a member of a controlled group.
Unless the yearly base period capital of
each corporation is redetermined it would
seem that the intercompany transactions
would not be eliminated entirely from all
of the factors affecting the income credit.
It should be pointed out that the intent
of the statute and of the Regulations
seems to be that the base period capital
addition of the acquiring corporation is
computed by combining the separate base
period capital additions in some instances
and by combining the separately deter
mined yearly base-period capital in other
instances. The exact method followed de
pends upon whether the Part II transac
tion occurs before or after the end of the
base period. There is no provision for
combining the equity capital of each cor
poration, the borrowed capital of each,
etc. Each of these factors is taken into
account in its appropriate place, and only
the computed base period capital addition
or yearly base period capital is combined.
Thus, where the Part II transaction oc
curs during an excess-profits-tax year and
the separate base period capital additions
are combined, the fact that one of the
corporations had a zero base period capi
tal addition (because its yearly base pe
riod capital decreased rather than in
creased) would not operate to reduce the
base period capital addition of the other
corporation. The result is the sum of the
two, separately computed. But, where the
transaction occurred during the base pe
riod and the separately computed yearly
base period capital is combined, a decrease
in the case of one corporation would off
set an increase in the yearly base period
capital of the other.

So far I have dealt only with the base
period capital addition in the situation
where one corporation acquires all of the
assets of another. Turning now to the net
capital changes subsequent to the base
period, section 463 applies only when the
Part II transaction occurs in an excessprofits-tax year and only when the aver
age base period net income is being com
puted under Part II.
The proposed regulations dealing with
this point are also quite complicated but
may be broken down into two situations;
namely, whether the transaction occurred
before or after June 30, 1950. If the trans
action occurred after June 30, 1950, then
any property paid in during the year for
stock of the component or distributions
made during the year which were not out
of earnings and profits are taken into ac
count by the acquiring corporation begin
ning with the day after the transaction.
Also, where the transaction occurs after
June 30, 1950, the difference between the
equity capital of the component at the be
ginning of that year as compared with the
beginning of its first excess-profits-tax
year is taken into account in computing
the acquiring corporation’s daily capital
addition or reduction beginning with the
day of the transaction. This rule applies
only for the year of the transaction, and
for subsequent years the equity capital of
the component as of the beginning of its
first excess-profits-tax year is combined
with that of the acquiring corporation as
of the beginning of its first excess-profitstax year.
Likewise, the daily borrowed capital of
the component as of the beginning of its
first excess-profits-tax year and the origi
nal inadmissible assets are added to the
corresponding amounts of the acquiring
corporation. In the year of the transaction
the same amounts are added to the daily
borrowed capital and daily inadmissible
assets of the acquiring corporation for
each day preceding the transaction so that
as a result it has a zero effect for the part
of the year prior to the transaction, and
any subsequent changes are reflected for
the remainder of the year. Loans to mem
bers of a controlled group and inadmis
sible assets representing stock of members
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of a controlled group are similarly han
dled.
If the transaction occurred after the
beginning of the first excess-profits-tax
year of the acquiring corporation but prior
to July 1, 1950, then all computations
which are ordinarily made as of the be
ginning of the first excess-profits-tax year
of the component are made as of the time
immediately prior to the transaction. For
instance, if both of the corporations were
on a calendar year basis and the transac
tion occurred April 1, 1950, the base peri
od capital addition would have been
determined for each corporation to and
including January 1, 1950. But for the
purpose of determining the net capital
changes subsequent to the base period, the
transaction date of April 1, 1950, is used
in lieu of January 1, 1950, for all com
putations necessary to determine the re
spective items of the component to be
added to those of the acquiring corpora
tion as of January 1, 1950. The Regula
tions distinguish between transactions
which occurred before or after June 30,
1950. It is at variance with the theory of
constructive taxable years which the com
ponent is deemed to have under Section
40.464-1 (b) (4) relating to base period
capital addition. For instance, January 1,
1950, is used as the end of the base period
for the purpose of computing the base
period capital addition of such a compo
nent but April 1, 1950, would be used to
measure the equity capital and borrowed
capital of the component to be added to
the respective original amounts of the ac
quiring corporation determined as of Jan
uary 1, 1950. To the extent that such items
of the component changed between Jan
uary 1, 1950, and April 1, 1950, the re
sult would be inequitable.
The Regulations also provide for the
elimination of intercompany transactions
in determining the net capital changes
since the base period. In order to accom
plish that purpose intercorporate stock
holdings and intercompany loans are ex
cluded as of the same dates as of which the
original inadmissible assets and original
equity capital are determined, and again
the date depends upon whether the trans
action was before or after June 30, 1950.
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The Regulations under section 463 and
464 supply rules to apply the limitations
under section 462(j) (1) relating to the
elimination of a possible duplication in
transferred capital additions in cases
where after December 31, 1945, the ac
quiring corporation purchased stock of a
corporation in whole or in part for cash
or other assets and that corporation sub
sequently becomes a component. The ef
fect of the rules is to eliminate the ap
propriate portion of the base period capital
addition and the net capital changes prior
to the purchase of the stock. For instance,
if the acquiring corporation had purchased
30% of the stock of the component on
April 1, 1949, then 30% of the yearly base
period capital of the component as of
January 1, 1948, and January 1, 1949,
would be eliminated. If the purchase
had occurred on April 1, 1950, then 30%
of the entire base period capital addi
tion would be eliminated and also 30%
of the original equity capital, original
inadmissible assets, and the other factors
necessary to determine the starting point
for computing the net capital addition
would not be taken into account.
No adjustment is necessary under sec
tion 462(j) (1) except to the extent dup
lication of experience occurs. Section 40.462-10 of the proposed Regulations recog
nizes that no duplication of base period
experience may have occurred where the
stock of the component is acquired through
the use of money obtained through a bona
fide increase in the capital structure
(whether equity or borrowed) for the pur
pose of acquisition. The Regulations un
der sections 463 and 464 follow through
in such a situation and provide for the
exclusion from the base period capital
addition or the net capital changes of
such amount as is necessary to prevent
the acquiring corporation having not only
the benefit of the base period experience
but also a possible duplication as a result
of increased capital. These provisions in
the Regulations are in very general terms
and are not too clear. For instance, it is
provided (Section 40.464-1(c) (2) ) that
there shall be excluded from the base
period capital addition of the acquiring
corporation so much thereof as is attribu
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table to assets obtained for the purpose of
acquiring the stock in the component in
such a transaction. If the purchase oc
curred during the base period, it would
appear that the yearly base period capital
for any date after the purchase would
have to be recomputed to eliminate the
increased capital structure by which the
funds were provided. In addition, the
Regulations provide that in the case of
determining the net capital changes so
much of the increase in equity capital and
of the increase in borrowed capital as is
attributable to assets obtained for the pur
pose of acquiring the stock shall be ex
cluded.
It would have been helpful if the Regu
lations had provided specific examples to
illustrate how this general rule should be
applied. For instance, suppose that some
of the stock of a component had been
purchased from its stockholders for
$100,000 in cash, all of which was ob
tained by a new bank loan. Such loan
would have been included in the
amount of $75,000 as borrowed capital
in computing the base period capital addi
tion or the net capital changes of the ac
quiring corporation, less an appropriate
interest adjustment, but how much is at
tributable to the assets obtained for the
purpose of acquiring the stock; that is,
what amount must be eliminated? Is it the
entire cost of $100,000? Is it the $75,000
which was included in borrowed capital?
Or is it 75% of the unpaid balance of the
note payable on the dates that the neces
sary computations are made? Also, is a
portion of the interest adjustment excluded
as well? It is my own opinion that it might
be logical to require the elimination of
whatever amount may have been includ
able in either equity or borrowed capital
as the source of the funds at the moment
of the purchase and that the same amount
might justifiably be required to be elimi
nated in all subsequent computations. Such
a rule, however, might work inequities
where the financing was arranged on a
temporary rather than a permanent basis,
and perhaps it is just as well that the
Regulations deal with this point only in a
general way. The fact remains that the
computation to be made is vague and un

certain and subject to controversy.
The general situation in section 461(a)
(1) (E), where only part of the assets of
the component are transferred to an ac
quiring corporation, would be the case
where an existing corporation is split up
into two corporations, a subsidiary corpor
ation is created, or the assets of a part
nership are transferred in part to a
corporation. In most cases the acquiring
corporation will be a new corporation
created incident to the transaction.
In such a situation, if the transaction
occurs after the beginning of the first ex
cess-profits-tax year of the component,
then the acquiring corporation takes over
that portion of the base period capital ad
dition of the component measured by the
ratio of the fair-market value of the assets
transferred to the fair-market value of all
assets of the component immediately prior
to the transaction.
Since the transaction may have occurred
during the first excess-profits-tax year of
one corporation and during the preceding
taxable year of the other corporation,
special rules are necessary. Where the
transaction occurs during a preceding year
of the component, then the yearly base
period capital of the acquiring corporation
for the year of the transaction is com
puted as of the day following the trans
action, which thereby would include
the assets transferred. If, however, the
transaction occurs in the first excessprofits-tax year of the acquiring cor
poration and in a preceding year of the
component, then the yearly base period
capital addition of the acquiring corpora
tion for its first preceding year would be
the portion of the yearly base period capi
tal of the component for the first day of
its year in which the transaction occurred.
Here again the portion is determined by
the ratio of the fair-market value of the
assets transferred. While these rules are
quite complicated, a simple example might
help to clarify them. If the component cor
poration had a fiscal year ended June 30
and transferred some of its assets to a
newly formed corporation on April 1, 1950,
and the acquiring corporation adopted the
calendar year basis, then July 1, 1948,
July 1, 1949, and April 1, 1950, would be
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the dates to be used in computing the
yearly base-period capital transferred to
the acquiring corporation.
While the portion of the base period
capital addition or the yearly base period
capital transferred to the acquiring corpor
ation in an “E” transaction is measured by
the ratio of fair-market value of assets, the
same yardstick is not used for the purpose
of determining the transferred net capital
addition. In such a case, section 463 ap
plies where the transaction occurred in
an excess-profits-tax-year and it becomes
necessary to determine for the acquiring
corporation the original equity capital,
original borrowed capital, and original in
admissible assets as of the beginning of its
first excess-profits-tax-year. In this situa
tion the equity capital of the component
as of the beginning of its first excess-pro
fits-tax year is allocated to the acquiring
corporation in the proportion that the
equity capital transferred bears to the
equity capital of the component immed
iately prior to the transaction. Likewise,
the borrowed capital of the component at
the beginning of its first excess-profits-tax
year is allocated in the ratio that the bor
rowed capital transferred is to the total
borowed capital of the component immed
iately prior to the transaction. In the same
manner the original inadmissible assets of
the component are allocated in the pro
portion that the inadmissible assets trans
ferred to the acquiring corporation bear to
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the total inadmissible assets of the com
ponent immediately prior to the transac
tion. This may result in some unrealistic
allocations. For instance, equity capital is
measured by the adjusted basis of the as
sets transferred, which may be substantial
ly more or less than their fair-market
value. In many cases it may well result
that the ratios of equity capital and bor
rowed capital transferred are not in line
with the fair-market value ratio used in
allocating average base-period net income
and the base-period capital addition.
In most cases where a component trans
fers only a part of its assets to an ac
quiring corporation, the acquiring corpor
ation will be a new corporation created
incident to the transaction. In those unus
ual circumstances where the acquiring
corporation had been in existence prior to
the “E” transaction, however the statute
left the rules to be prescribed by the
Regulations.
The Regulations (Section 40.461-7 (b)),
provide that in such a case the component
will be deemed to have transferred a part
of its assets to an imaginary corporation
and that such an imaginary corporation
then transferred all of its assets to the
acquiring corporation. In that way the
general rules of an “E” transaction apply
to the first assumed transfer to the imagi
nary corporation, and the general rules
relating to the transfer of all assets apply
to the second assumed transfer.
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